By Gary LaMoshi

DENPASAR, Bali – Praise poured in to honor Indonesia’s fourth president, Abdurrahman Wahid, on his death last week at the age of 69. The richly deserved tributes recalled Wahid’s wit, his leadership of the country’s largest grassroots Muslim organization, and his commitment to pluralism.

There’s even talk of declaring Wahid, affectionately known as Gus Dur, a national hero. His usually reticent successor and some-time rival, Megawati Sukarnoputri, said, “Gus Dur meets the requirements,” and indicated that her political party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), had already endorsed his enshrinement.

But the plaudits ignore the dark side of Wahid’s 21-month

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// ]]>// <![CDATA[// presidential term, which marked the nation’s definitive break with Suharto’s New Order authoritarianism. The national mourning for Wahid failed to examine what has become of the reformasi (reform) movement that brought Wahid to power, the backlash against his presidency, and why Wahid was the lone genuine reformer to occupy Merdeka Palace and remain prominent as a reformer on the political scene throughout the near dozen years since Suharto’s fall in 1998.
Wahid’s presidency set back the cause of reform, perhaps crippled it forever. Ironically, his term in office strengthened the hand of Islamic extremists and the military. It also set the stage for sectarian violence and terrorist attacks that killed thousands and threatened unity across the archipelago. Most important, Wahid’s bungled presidency illustrated the potential cost of democracy to the old guard before it stripped their power to derail reform.

Born in East Java in 1940, Wahid was the first child in a prominent family of religious leaders and nationalists. His grandfather, Hasyim Asy’ari, founded Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), destined to grow into Indonesia’s largest grassroots Muslim organization with 50 million members. Wahid was chosen as NU chairman in 1984, a post that gave him a power base and a public pulpit to advocate pluralism and personal choice in religion. NU took a liberal line on religious matters through its acceptance of mixing pre-Islamic traditions with Muslim practice. A 1998 stroke, brought on by diabetes, left Wahid nearly blind and dogged by health woes throughout his remaining years.

Wahid’s NU post drew him into politics, even though he’d withdrawn NU from formal politics; like religion, politics was a matter of personal choice. In the early 1990s, Suharto tried to recruit Muslim leaders as allies, but Wahid was among those who resisted. That put him in conflict with Suharto’s New Order and made him a leading dissident figure at a time when there wasn’t much dissent. Wahid allied with Megawati; the daughter of Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, she headed one of the officially sanctioned opposition parties. Her popularity would make her a threat to Suharto and the focal point of the burgeoning reformasi movement that gained momentum as the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia.

Killing unarmed protesters and deadly riots of murky origin forced Suharto to step down in May 1998. Wahid took a leadership role in the new National Awakening Park (known by its Indonesian acronym, PKB) and was nominated as its candidate for president in the 1999 election. Voters would choose 500 legislators, who, along with 200 regional and group representatives, would select the president.

These were heady times, with reformasi thick in the air as Indonesia held its first free general election since 1955. Predictably, Megawati’s party won the largest number of votes in the election, 34% of the total, while Wahid’s PKB finished third with 13%. Supporters of reform expected Megawati to become president. PKB backed Megawati against the incumbent, Suharto’s vice president, BJ Habibie.

However, a coalition of Muslim parties, led by reform figure Amien Rais, emerged to block Megawati’s selection. Amid fervent backroom dealing reminiscent of the Suharto era or mid-20th century Chicago, Wahid supported Rais to head the legislature and Rais’ coalition backed Wahid for the presidency. In the vice presidential voting, Wahid prevailed on Suharto’s military chief General Wiranto to withdraw, clearing the field for Megawati to get the executive consolation prize.

Reform’s failure
Wahid took the presidency with a mandate for reform but failed to capitalize on it. His reform movement never articulated a coherent program for reform, nor set out a coordinated program for it. Some of that was the legacy of Suharto, who had effectively stunted political development for more than three decades. But some of the fault belongs with Wahid himself for failing to seize the moment and rally popular support for the cause. His death revealed a well of public goodwill that Wahid never managed to tap as president.

Wahid’s presidency featured many admirable steps. He abolished Suharto’s levers of political control, including the Ministry of Information. He lifted a number of measures that discriminated against the Chinese minority and declared Chinese New Year a national holiday. He began to fight the endemic corruption of the New Order by disbanding the Ministry of Welfare.

Armed with a keen intellect, acid tongue, and firmly convinced of his own righteousness, Wahid wasn’t ideally suited for a political life of compromise. Even though he assembled a broad cabinet that included all factions, his forte was getting out in front and expecting others to follow, rather than building consensus and moving incrementally. That would cost Wahid dearly when he moved to reform the military.

Throughout the transition from Suharto’s rule, the military under Wiranto had largely gone along with reform. Wiranto had prevented elements of the military, reportedly including Suharto’s former son-in-law (and Megawati’s 2009 running mate), Prabowo Subianto, from staging a coup as Suharto stepped down amid street protests. Wiranto also cooperated with separating the military and police, and supported disengaging the military from politics, earning him the mantle of reformer. The withdrawal from East Timor, which voted for independence in a 1999 referendum, was bloody and destructive, but it was accomplished without a mutiny within the bitterly opposed ranks of the armed forces.

Wahid appointed Wiranto as his Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security, the second most important role in the government. Yet there’s little evidence that Wahid used Wiranto as a bridge to build support for change. Many in the military would be happy to see a genuine separation between politics and the armed forces, but it would be a separation running both ways – soldiers would stay out of politics, but politicians would stay out of military affairs, including alleged human rights abuses and the armed forces vast network of businesses, legal and otherwise. (That appears to be the current modus vivendi under incumbent president and former general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.) But when Wahid began to attack corruption within the military’s business empire and fired Wiranto after just three months on the job, the gloves came off.

The military moved to destabilize Wahid’s government. It allegedly began stoking and arming sectarian violence in Ambon and central Sulawesi. The military also apparently supported coordinated church bombings on Christmas Eve 2000, and helped rehabilitate radical Islam that had been discredited under Suharto.
Wahid’s erratic governing style and lack of skill as an administrator left him with few political allies. Rather than deriding the legislature as a “kindergarten” and later a pre-school “play group”, he could have advanced the notion of legislative accountability. His presidency was characterized by off-hand remarks and snap decisions that began to disillusion supporters of reform – a process Megawati completed as his successor with a thoroughly corrupt regime that harked back to the Suharto era.

The corruption charges against Wahid that led to his impeachment were trumped up, but the sentiment that his presidency had failed was real and unfortunate. Cornering the military dragon without the power to subdue it has let the armed forces continue to occupy an outsized role in Indonesian society. Failing to present a good government alternative to business as usual has doomed Indonesia to another generation of endemic corruption and the widespread poverty that goes with it.

Wahid was a fine man with a lifetime of lasting achievements, but with his passing it is important to remember that he was no hero to Indonesia’s reformers.

Longtime editor of investor rights advocate eRaider.com, Gary LaMoshihas written for Slate and Salon.com, and works a counselor for Writing Camp (www.writingcamp.net). He first visited Indonesia in 1994 and has tracking its progress ever since.