Mohammad Jamil

The Indian Army is now revising its five-year-old doctrine to effectively meet the challenges of war with China and Pakistan, deal with asymmetric and fourth-generation warfare, and enhance strategic reach and joint operations with the IAF and Navy

The future of Asia, as an
engine of growth for the rest of the world or the region marred with war and threats of war, depends on the leaderships of the countries of the region. When army generals start issuing policy statements and do not watch their words, the consequences could be disastrous. The unveiling of the ‘two-front’ strategy by Indian Army Chief, General Deepak Kapoor, during a closed-door seminar targeting China and Pakistan simultaneously sounds rather overambitious. His prattle included: “The armed forces have to substantially enhance their strategic reach and out-of-area capabilities to protect India’s geo-political interests stretching from the Gulf to the Malacca Straits.” The plan now is to launch self-contained and highly-mobile ‘battle groups’, with Russian-origin T-90S tanks and upgraded T-72 M1 tanks at their core, adequately backed by air cover and artillery fire assaults, for rapid thrusts into enemy territory within 96 hours. The question arises as to whether the war would last 96 hours between two nuclear states?

General Kapoor’s claim of taking on Pakistan and China simultaneously needs an honest and objective analysis whether it is rhetoric or what he says is achievable. So far as conventional weapons are concerned, India has only quantitative edge over Pakistan but falls short in qualitative terms. As regards nuclear capability, Indian scientists had confirmed that at least the test of a thermonuclear device had failed because shockwave readings recorded were those of a conventional nuclear device and certainly not of a Hydrogen Bomb. After the Mumbai attacks, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had toyed with the idea of limited war or surgical strikes, and even the Americans were of the opinion that India should be allowed to hit a specified area in Pakistan to give vent to India’s anger. However, General Kapoor had then expressed his inability to attack on the pretext of lack of sophisticated and quality equipment.

According to a newspaper report, the Indian Army is now revising its five-year-old doctrine to effectively meet the challenges of war with China and Pakistan, deal with asymmetric and fourth-generation warfare, and enhance strategic reach and joint operations with the IAF and Navy. The new war doctrine is being worked out at Simla-based Army Training Command headed by Lieutenant-General AS Lamba, who boasted that a massive thrust in Rawalpindi could quiet Pakistanis within 48 hours of the start of the assault. The Indian Generals should bear in mind that when it comes to war it is not doctrines that determine its course but fighting assumes its own momentum that determines the course. There is a perception that General Kapoor’s rhetoric of a two-front war strategy is meant to threaten the insurgents and terrorists in India. According to South Asia Terrorism Portal’s report 2007, at least 231 of the country’s 608 districts were afflicted by various insurgent and terrorist movements in differing intensities. In addition, wide areas of the country appear to have ‘fallen off the map’ of good governance, and are acutely susceptible to violent political mobilisation, lawlessness and organised criminal activity. In this backdrop one can conclude that India is awash with home-grown terrorist organisations and can implode from within without any outside effort. Coming back to India’s ‘two-front strategy’, one has to remind the Indian generals that it had failed when Germany prepared a two-front strategy — Russia and Europe. The US’s two-front strategy — Iraq and Afghanistan — is also doomed to failure. The question is, can India be successful, especially when it has deployed 700,000 troops in Indian-Held Kashmir (IHK), and has started military operations against the Maoists?

Whereas India has been trying to prove itself as a responsible nuclear state, its Generals’ statements have caused tremendous embarrassment to the government. Ahead of General Kapoor’s first official visit to Nepal, the Indian government distanced itself from the controversy raked up by his reported statement about the Maoist army in Nepal, saying it did not reflect the government’s position. On January 4, 2010, the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu said: “We have seen media reports attributing certain remarks to the Indian Chief of Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor on the issue of the integration of the (Maoist) People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the Nepal Army. These do not reflect the government of India’s position on the issue.” The Maoists condemned the Indian general’s reported statement as naked intervention in Nepal’s internal matter. General Kapoor was reported as saying last month that the PLA should not be merged with the Nepal Army as it would lead to the politicisation of the state army. China is also determined to retrieve the land occupied by India in Arunachal Pradesh. Many defence analysts are of the view that Arunachal is a flashpoint like or even more than Taiwan.

As recently as January 3, 2010, Indian External Affairs Minister SM Krishna in an interview emphasised that China’s continued supply of weapons to Pakistan and activities of Chinese companies in Azad Kashmir were a matter of concern, and India was talking about all these issues with China. Explaining why India sees these activities in Azad Kashmir as ‘illegal’, Krishna said: “Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of the country; neither Pakistan nor China has a locus standi there.” But it is not true because the Kashmir dispute is still pending in the UN awaiting implementation of UN Security Council resolutions whereby the Kashmiris had been given the right to decide about joining Pakistan or India through a plebiscite to be held under the aegis of the UN. Whereas the US seems to have invoked its policy of containing China in a subtle manner, Beijing is also making preparations for any eventuality and building up its military strength to project power not only regionally but also to contend with the US as a major player in global politics. Nevertheless, the Chinese leaders hope that frictions can be contained and overwhelmed by the two nations’ shared interest in prosperity. The Chinese leadership also understands that economic power is the most important and most essential factor in comprehensive national power, which is why China has all along focused on increasing its economic strength keeping in mind that its military strength depends on the former.

The writer is a freelance columnist. He can be reached at mjamil1938@hotmail.com