By Sudha Ramachandran

BANGALORE – Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka’s presidential aspirations received a shot in the arm this week when a key Tamil party, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), promised him support in presidential elections to be held on January 26.

In an election in which the majority Sinhala vote seems split down the middle between the two frontrunners – incumbent Mahinda Rajapaksa and the opposition’s Fonseka – the TNA’s endorsement of the latter could prove crucial.

The TNA’s support of Fonseka is not without its ironies. Widely regarded as a proxy of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the TNA with 22 seats in parliament was a mouthpiece of the rebel group. It was a bitter critic of the government’s military operations in Tamil areas and at the forefront of calls for a ceasefire in the months preceding the final offensive against the LTTE. As army chief, Fonseka was the man who spearheaded the military operations that culminated in the LTTE’s annihilation in May last year.
As far as the TNA is concerned, both President Rajapaksa and Fonseka have “bloody records vis-a-vis the Tamils”, a TNA member of parliament told Asia Times Online. Indeed, if Fonseka carried out the military offensive against the LTTE, with little concern for high civilian casualties, Rajapaksa authorized it. And both have in the past shown little willingness to address Tamil grievances.

Since his election as president in 2005, Rajapaksa has shown no inclination to address the ethnic conflict, denying the very existence of an ethnic problem and preferring to see the crisis as one of “LTTE terrorism” alone. This disinclination has accentuated since May, with a tidal wave of Sinhala triumphalism sweeping the country following the defeat of the LTTE.

As for Fonseka, he is a known Sinhala supremacist. He is of the view that “Sri Lanka belongs to the Sinhalese” and that “minority communities”, like the Tamils, “can live in this country with us”. In a 2008 interview, Fonseka said Tamils “must not try, under the pretext of being a minority, to demand undue things”.

But both Rajapaksa and Fonseka are now singing a different tune with the Tamil vote emerging as critical in a close presidential race.

In the months following the defeat of the LTTE, the president and the general both claimed the credit. Rajapaksa went on an all-out campaign to build a cult around himself as “savior” of the island’s Sinhalese majority. A miffed Fonseka hit out, as relations between the two – once close allies in the project to defeat the LTTE – deteriorated.

In a bid to clip Fonseka’s wings, Rajapaksa elevated him to the post of chief of defense staff (CDS), a largely ceremonial post with reduced powers. A miffed Fonseka resigned and then entered the presidential race.

Much has changed in the presidential race since Fonseka threw his hat in the ring.

Two months ago, a landslide victory for Rajapaksa seemed a foregone conclusion. Fonseka has changed that. Backed by a motley coalition of opposition parties who are united in their determination to unseat Rajapaksa, Fonseka is putting up a formidable challenge. He has the backing of the United National Party (UNP), the Marxist Janata Vimukti Peramuna and also the support of key minority parties like the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the Western Peoples Front (WPF). Not only has he managed to bite into what seemed the president’s impregnable Sinhala support base but he has also now got the backing of the TNA.

With the Sinhala vote divided between them, the island’s Tamils have emerged as important kingmakers, with the potential of tipping the balance in favor of either candidate.

Over the past several years, Rajapaksa and Fonseka cared little for Tamil sentiment or suffering and bombed Tamil civilians in the name of fighting “LTTE terrorists”.

Now they are assiduously courting Tamil support. If Fonseka wrote to the president expressing “deep concern” for the plight of the nearly 200,000 Tamil internally displaced persons (IDPs), the latter sought to outdo him by allowing the IDPs languishing in detentions camps to return home and lifting restrictions on freedom of movement in Tamil areas. The Rajapaksa camp has put out a high-profile campaign to reach out to the largely Hindu Tamil voters by showing the president – a Buddhist – worshipping at Hindu temples.

But Fonseka seems to be ahead of the president in the battle for the Tamil vote. While Rajapaksa has the support of Tamil parties like the Eelam Peoples Democratic Party and the Ceylon Workers’ Congress, Fonseka has managed to clinch endorsement from the TNA.

It appears that Fonseka’s “satisfactory” assurances to the TNA about finding a political resolution to Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict sealed the deal. TNA leader R Sambandan has said that Fonseka agreed to consider Tamil demands for a meaningful devolution of power to the provinces and to free Tamil detainees within a month of his election if no charges had been brought against them. In a letter to the TNA, the former army chief has also pledged to free civil administration in the north “from military, police and political interference”. He has also pledged to end the state of emergency which has been in force in the island since March 1983.

In the 2005 presidential election, the LTTE called for a boycott of the poll, a call that provided a boost to Rajapaksa’s electoral fortunes. How the TNA endorsement of Fonseka will play out in the vote remains to be seen. While it is certain to narrow the gap between Rajapaksa and Fonseka, it is still unclear whether it will be adequate to propel Fonseka to the presidency.

The Rajapaksa camp has been using state resources and the media to boost the president’s image. It has been projecting a Fonseka victory as resulting in a military dictatorship in Sri Lanka. Indeed, Fonseka as a career soldier has little experience in the working of a democracy. But Rajapaksa, his long years of experience in the political arena notwithstanding, is no democrat either.

Analysts have pointed out that while Fonseka, like Rajapaksa, will likely do little good for the island’s fraying democracy, he has at least forced the president to tone down his Sinhala-Buddhist triumphalism. He could also weaken the Rajapaksa’s brothers’ long-term political project of consolidating their hold over political power.

Even if Fonseka does not win the presidency, he could force the vote to a second round, undermining the Rajapaksa brothers’ dreams of crafting a constitution to suit their dynastic ambitions.

“If Fonseka can deprive Rajapaksa of an outright victory by pushing the election into a second round, the fallout may limit the ruling United People’s Freedom Alliance [UPFA] to only a marginal victory at the parliamentary election [which must take place by April 22, 2010], thus preventing any legislative intervention in the constitution,” Tisarenee Gunasekara, a Colombo-based political commentator points out. “The Fonseka factor has now rendered uncertain not only the outcome of the presidential election but also that of the parliamentary polls and thus the very future of the Rajapaksa project.”

Keen to tap into the groundswell of Sinhala nationalist support and confident of a landslide win in presidential polls, that would in turn pave the way for an outright victory in parliamentary polls, Rajapaksa brought presidential polls forward by two years.

While he is still ahead in the race for the presidency, Rajapaksa’s re-election might not be as easy as originally envisaged. The Fonseka factor could kick in and upset Rajapaksa’s plans. Helped by an unlikely ally, the TNA, Fonseka could force Rajapaksa to trim his ambitions.

Sudha Ramachandran is an independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore.