Ishtiaq Ahmed

Sectarian terrorism is a product of the fierce political competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran to claim the leadership of Muslims. Both have their coffers filled with staggering amounts of wealth derived from the sale of oil

The horrific attack on 10th Muharram, i.e. December 28, 2009, on a Shia procession in Karachi claimed at least 43 lives and inflicted injuries on hundreds of others. It was followed by attacks on more than 2,000 shops and businesses. The estimated damage is appreciated to the tune of Rs 30 to 50 billion. The authorities are claiming that such rioting was not a spontaneous expression of anger by a crowd gone berserk, but well-planned and organised looting and pillaging.

Whereas the immediate culprits may defy detection, the overall context in which sectarian terrorism flourishes is not difficult to describe. Post-World War II, the movement of goods and people progressively intensified till we entered the so-called Globalisation Era. Since then the flow of the factors of production and the instantaneity and immediacy of the dissemination of news, rumours, ideas and ideologies has become irreversible. Just as in economic terms the flow is tilted in favour of strong economies, similarly in politics it is tilted in favour of rich, influential states.

Sectarian terrorism is a product of the fierce political competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran to claim the leadership of Muslims. Both have their coffers filled with staggering amounts of wealth derived from the sale of oil. Both are rentier states that receive income from a gift of nature rather than through hard work and elaborate production as has been the basis for the wealth of Japan, South Korea and now China. Saudi Arabia and Iran’s export comprises Islamist ideas and ideology and nothing else. Unsurprisingly, such ideas and ideology are a reflection of what these two societies practice in their internal domain.

Saudi Arabia unabashedly subscribes to Wahabiism, which though theologically a part of the diverse Sunni framework has historically waged armed struggle against both traditional Sunni societies and particularly Shiaism. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, Wahabi fanatics attacked and pillaged Sunni and Shia monuments and shrines and killed their followers in the Arabian Peninsula. At one point, the Wahabis even intended to dismantle the mausoleum of the Prophet (PBUH) as the veneration displayed by devotees was considered shirk (an act of idolatry).

After the Saudis captured power in 1924 and established their kingdom over the Arabian mainland, the 3-5 percent Shia minority living in the eastern provinces has been systematically and comprehensively discriminated against and persecuted. The Shias get the worst jobs and have to hide their identity if they relocate outside traditional Shia areas. There is absolutely no Shia representation in the Saudi state hierarchy. No Shia mosque is to be found anywhere outside the eastern provinces.

The history of Iran is almost identical. Historically, until the end of the 15th century, Iran was a Sunni majority society. All that changed when Ismail Safavid captured power at the beginning of the 16th century and declared Ithna Ashari Shiasim as the state ideology. Iranians were given a choice to convert to Shiaism or face the sword or leave the country. Thousands migrated to India. Among them were followers of Sunni Sufi orders such as Naqshbandia, Qadria and Suhrawardia.

Sunnis survived in Iran only among ethnic minorities in the far away provinces of Balochistan, Kurdistan and Khuzestan. After Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iranian revolution of 1979, orthodox Shiaism was again made the state ideology. The result was that the 9-10 percent Sunni population has been subjected to comprehensive discrimination. Thus for example, out of a current population of 14 million Sunnis, there is not a single Sunni in the Iranian government or state hierarchy. In an 8 million strong Tehran, there is not a single Sunni mosque. The same is true of other cities. Sunnis must conceal their names such as Umar and Usman if they live in mainstream society.

While Saudi Arabia is considered a status quo factor in the Muslim world and during the Cold War was the fountainhead of anti-secular movements and opposed Gemal Abdul Nasser after the fall of the Shah dictatorship in 1979, Iran successfully projected itself as the radical challenger and changer. It tried its hand first at effecting change in Iraq. Khomeini gave a call for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, hoping that the Iraqi Shia majority will heed his prompting. Saddam Hussein responded with a pre-emptive military attack on Iran. The result was a nine year-long useless and pointless war (1980-88) that left at least 1.5 million Iranians and Iraqis dead.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah emerged as a pro-Iranian movement. The result was sectarian strife in that country. More importantly, by assuming a completely rejectionist stand vis-à-vis Israel, Iran sent completely misleading signals to Hamas. When Israel launched massive aerial bombing on the Gaza strip in the winter of 2008-2009, Hezbollah did not fire a single rocket and Iran kept its threats confined to verbal hyperbole at most.

The Iranian revolution deeply impacted Pakistan. My own research based on interviews with people shows that some rituals deeply offensive to Sunnis were publicly displayed in Jhang, Chakwal and outside Shahdara, near Lahore. However, a crisis erupted when General Ziaul Haq introduced the alms tax, zakat, in 1980 and the Shias refused to pay it saying that they pay it to their own clerics. Some even said that they paid to the mullahs in Qom or in Iraq. Although I normally have the harshest of words for Zia’s Islamisation, it must be said that zakat was not a sectarian tax.

Greatly unsettled by the perceived growing Iranian influence in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia began to patronise anti-Shia movements in Pakistan. The 1990s saw unprecedented sectarian terrorism — neither mosques, nor Imambargahs, nor graveyards were spared. During 1990-2002, 539 Shias and 388 Sunnis were killed. The Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in 1996 and fell from it in the end of 2001. Many Taliban warriors joined forces with rabidly anti-Shia organisations such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan. The attack in Karachi on December 28 on Shias is almost certainly a continuation of sectarian terrorism that had been going on for years but was eclipsed recently by the Taliban attacking government functionaries.

The moral of the story is that Saudi and Iranian influence in Pakistan is divisive and destructive. It must be curbed. How a poor and terror-ravaged state and society should manage this huge task is of course a very difficult question to answer. The first step towards it is to create awareness of the peril that is always lurking in our midst.

Ishtiaq Ahmed is a Visiting Research Professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) and the South Asian Studies Programme at the National University of Singapore. He is also a Professor of Political Science at Stockholm University. He has published extensively on South Asian politics. At ISAS, he is currently working on a book, Is Pakistan a Garrison State? He can be reached at isasia@nus.edu.sg