Zafar Hilaly

Obama is far too busy trying to prove that he is not a wimp to act as a statesman. However, had Pakistan spelt out the terms for its cooperation, a great deal of pressure on the government not to toe the disastrous US policy would have abated

“You let a bully into your front yard, the next day he will be on your porch,” said Lyndon Johnson (while referring to Vietnam). Pakistanis feel the same. Our leaders let the US into their front yard several decades ago and today there is an American presence not only in our front yard and porch, but in virtually every room of the house. The US first came as a friend, stayed on as a master, then left and has now returned in the shape of a bully.

Friend, master or bully, Pakistan’s establishment is ever welcoming of US assistance. This suits our psyche. We have always sought to gratify our desires with the least exertion. This accounts somewhat for our lack of success economically. Corruption, bad policies, an iniquitous tax structure and a world in recession account for the rest. Hence, today our dependence on the US assistance is well nigh total. Military assistance, the Kerry Lugar handout, US-solicited help in the form of IMF bailouts and access to the US market and — at the US’s urging — that of the EU, is what is keeping Pakistan’s economy afloat. Without them the rupee may not be worth the paper it is printed on and whatever survives of the textile industry would have collapsed a while ago.

Nor does the US influence stop at the economy. In our internal affairs too the US has primacy. Holbrooke assumed as much when he said last week that if necessary, the US would be happy to play a role in bringing about better understanding between rival political forces within the country. And it takes only a cursory knowledge of our political set-up to realise that all major parties — including the armed forces, which are the largest political party in the country — are decisively swayed by American desires.

Benazir Bhutto owed her return to American intervention, so too Nawaz Sharif (to US’s surrogate, the Saudis), just as Musharraf’s departure was only possible after obtaining a nod from Washington. Needless to say, the structure of the present ramshackle coalition will also be decisively influenced by what Washington says. If told to get along with each other, the politicians may carp and cavil but will nevertheless do so. On the other hand, if allowed free rein, they will be at each other’s throats. Already they are straining at the leash.

The US’s interest in asserting its traditional authority over Pakistan at this juncture has less to do with the need to seize the strategic high ground before China enters the fray a decade or so hence, and more with the immediate danger the US faces of Pakistan becoming a lair for Islamic militants bent on wreaking havoc on the US and its allies and surrogates in the region. How to prevent this nightmarish scenario from becoming a reality is what preoccupies the American leadership.

Obama thinks he has found the answer. He came up with a proposition, which Pakistan could not refuse. Financial and military assistance for the foreseeable future along with American mentoring, or else invasion, despoliation, perhaps even disintegration, is what his emissaries implied awaits us. It is much the same message as that of Bush to Musharraf in the aftermath of 9/11. And, for all the criticism that Musharraf was subjected to after his quick consent eight years ago, the response this time too has been an unequivocal yes. With the benefit of hindsight, some say Musharraf was wrong; and let us, for the sake of argument, allow the past to bury itself instead of sitting and waiting to be admitted by the present. Was Mr Zardari also wrong?

Mr Zardari did not have to display the three o’clock in the morning courage that Napoleon thought was the rarest form of courage and which Musharraf’s response showed that he did not possess. In fact, Zardari did not have to decide until Obama had made up his own mind on the future course of the US policy in Afghanistan. And when this became clear, several weeks before it was officially announced, Mr Zardari could have demanded a one-to-one meeting with the US president.

At this meeting he should have held out the assurance that while Pakistan would not permit the use of its territory as a launching pad for Taliban attacks against Afghanistan, this would not be possible unless Pakistan was able to concentrate its forces in the numbers required, along with the appropriate weaponry, on the Afghan border. And that this, in turn, would not be possible without an extensive withdrawal of Indian forces from the Pak-India border.

Second, that his government had neither the resources, nor the political support in the public for such a policy, unless American assistance in the form of weaponry and funds were forthcoming; and also economic assistance on a scale that would make a meaningful difference to the lives of the population.

Third, to end the fighting, rather than merely contain the Taliban, it was imperative that the US fix a date for the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan followed by a UN-led effort to attempt a compromise solution of a broad-based interim government followed by elections. This should be preceded by a pledge by the Taliban not to permit the use of Afghan territory by al Qaeda.

Four, a pledge by Pakistan to strenuously pursue al Qaeda and its ilk, including the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the jaishes and lashkars located on Pakistani soil.

No doubt Mr Zardari’s proposals would have been rejected by Obama. Nor would Obama have agreed to set a definite date for American withdrawal from Afghanistan. Obama is far too busy trying to prove that he is not a wimp to act as a statesman. However, had Pakistan spelt out the terms for its cooperation, a great deal of the political pressure on the government not to toe the disastrous US policy of continuing to expand the war would have abated.

Moreover, at home and aboard Pakistan would have been seen as having taken a sensible and balanced stance of continuing to target al Qaeda and taking on the TTP in Pakistan while opposing involvement in the civil war in Afghanistan. Instead, our lack of a coherent policy suggests that given sufficient American pressure Pakistan will assuredly relent; and that whatever we may say about US incursions into Pak territory, we are malleable. All of this bodes ill for the future and, worse, confuses the public what precisely is the government’s position.

The writer is a former ambassador. He can be reached at charles123it@hotmail.com