| Developing an exit strategy |
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Talat Masood
The United States continues to push Pakistan that it should widen the scope of its military operations against the insurgents to include North Waziristan. Our army has been resisting for good reason. First, it is already overstretched, then winter has set in and widening the operation further could galvanise all tribes to coalesce. There is a distinct possibility that a military operation in North Waziristan would trigger a fresh wave of suicide attacks throughout the country. These reservations aside, even if the Pakistan army does undertake this operation in the near future and granted it is successful at the tactical level, genuine peace in the region will only come about if there is simultaneous progress in stabilising Afghanistan. What we have seen in South Waziristan that the top militant leadership of Pakistani Taliban has moved into North Wazistan with Hafiz Gul Bhadur, despite the undertaking by these groups that they will not provide sanctuary to hostile forces. Similarly, during the North Waziristan operation, possibilities exist that militants will move into other tribal hide-outs and settled areas or slip into Afghanistan and continue to pose a threat to Pakistan. The experience of the last nine years has shown that asymmetric balancing by the militants against Pakistan and the US in Afghanistan cannot be countered with superior conventional force alone. The other lesson is that US must avoid excessive unilateralism when formulating policies about Pakistan and the region. If it claims for a strategic and a long-term partnership, then the genuine interests of Pakistan have to be protected in its policies. It is not a question of merely consulting or informing Pakistan of its policy as it apparently has been doing in case of the Kerry- Lugar Bill and other major issues without taking its interests into account. The United States and NATO countries should realise that root of the problem lies primarily in Afghanistan and instead of pushing Pakistan to do more, it would be advisable if Washington would use the services of the ISI to act as an interlocutor with the Afghan Taliban and other militant entities to agree to a power-sharing agreement. If there is any country that can still influence the Taliban, it is Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia. Only a negotiated settlement can bring a modicum of stability in Afghanistan and provide an exit strategy to US and NATO forces. Increase in troop strength and intensification in military operations has always preceded withdrawal of forces. This was true for the Soviets in the 80s and should be applicable to the US now. The game in the region would change if the Afghan Talibans agree to a power-sharing agreement with the Karzai government and other political forces in the country. There are already indications that Hikmat Yar is disposed towards a negotiated settlement. The question is: does the US surge of 30,000 troops plus contribution of 5,000 from ISAF countries be sufficiently compelling for the Taliban to agree to come to the negotiating table. As of now they do not appear inclined towards a settlement knowing that the US troop withdrawal will commence in the next 15 to 18 months. But if Pakistan (ISI) were to pressure them, then the attitude of Taliban could be more accommodating. Surely they would be over-rating and miscalculating if they think that they will be the only powerful entity in the post-occupation period. Several other strong entities have emerged in Afghanistan in the last decade and are in a position to challenge the Taliban once the Americans leave. And these are all well armed and well financed, besides having local support. In addition to the Northern Alliance there is Hikmat Yar, the Haqqani group and several local warlords who will all demand their share in the power structure, even if today they are allies facing a common enemy. Then all Pashtuns are not Taliban. Considering these factors, the Afghan Taliban may well agree to a negotiated settlement in which they also de-link themselves from Al Qaeda. Moreover, the raison det’re of Taliban’s insurgency is to resist American and NATO occupation. On the other hand, the rationale for American presence is that the Taliban and Al Qaeda, whom they are giving sanctuary, pose a serious threat. In short, it is a meaningless and open-ended conflict with no end and the sooner the parties realise the futility of it, the better. In making both sides realise the folly of the current confrontation, the ISI can play a critical role. Once a peaceful settlement is reached in Afghanistan, the Pakistani Taliban would then lose their legitimacy and the movement will gradually fizzle out as will external help. This would greatly contribute in stabilising the tribal belt with a positive impact on the rest of Pakistan. In essence, the key to Afghanistan’s peace lies in Pakistan and, ironically, the peace in Pakistan is dependent on the stability and peace in Afghanistan. The ISI is clearly well placed to play a crucial role of an interlocutor between the Afghan Taliban and US, between the Haqqani, Hikmat Yar and the US and work for peace in the region. Of course for this it is necessary to gain the confidence and support of the US. This would be a far superior option to opening a new front in North Waziristan which may well unite the tribal forces with a huge blow to the rest of the country and the region. In the event of withdrawal of US forces, after arriving at a negotiated settlement with Taliban, Pakistan’s concerns over India’s excessive involvement in Afghanistan are also likely to fade. This policy approach by no means under estimates the very important role of Iran and other neighbouring countries, especially Russia and China in stabilising Afghanistan. Iran has close historical, cultural and religious ties with Afghanistan and has maintained strong economic and political links with its eastern provinces and with Northern Alliance. Iran, besides Pakistan, provides land-locked Afghanistan opening to the sea. China discreetly is developing deep commercial interests in Afghanistan and working on mining and infrastructure projects. Russia is showing renewed interest in Afghanistan. All these countries will like US to withdraw for their own reasons and are interested in the stability of Afghanistan to avoid its impact in their countries.. The writer is a retired lieutenant-general. Email: talat@comsats.net.pk |
