Is peace with the Taliban really possible? Going by what transpired in London on Thursday, the Afghan government and its western allies believe that a negotiated settlement is indeed the way forward.

The idea, in essence, is to divide the insurgents in Afghanistan by winning over a bloc of ostensibly war-weary leaders and luring foot soldiers with promises of jobs. It is said that many low-level fighters joined the Taliban for reasons that were more economic than ideological in nature and may lay down arms if given a viable alternative. Mr Karzai, for one, seems convinced that “disenchanted brothers” can be accommodated in the mainstream if they renounce violence and sever links with Al Qaeda. Then there is the perennial talk of wooing ‘moderate Taliban’ over to the government’s side. The problem is, do such people exist? And two, did the London summit on Afghanistan signal a bold new approach or offer a blueprint for the US-led coalition’s exit strategy?

Without discrediting the peace initiative in any way, the hurdles that lie ahead must be highlighted. It is clear that neither the Taliban nor Isaf are currently in a position to win the war in Afghanistan. What is more significant though is that the militants enjoy the upper hand right now, not the Afghan government and its international allies.

An olive branch at this stage may be seen by the Taliban as the West’s (read America’s) admission that the best it can achieve is a stalemate. This in turn may lead the militants to lie low while some colleagues defect to the other side and strike when the coalition forces feel that Afghanistan is stable enough for Isaf to leave. If that happens Afghanistan, and the region as a whole, could be back to square one.

If a UN envoy’s meeting with the ‘Quetta shura’ — apparently called at the latter’s request — is indicative of battle fatigue among sections of the Taliban, it is also no secret that the West wants out as quickly as possible. Consider this: There is talk of handing over full control over a number of provinces to the Afghan army and police by early 2011 while Mr Karzai feels his country needs 15 years of foreign military ‘help’. True, the US is stressing that talks with the Taliban will be accompanied by a surge in attacks on those unwilling to come to the negotiation table. But can the Taliban be so weakened in a year’s time that they can be dictated to from a position of strength? For now, what we have is just talk about talks.