Another week, another round of rumours that Hakeemullah Mehsud, the TTP leader on the run, has been killed by a drone strike. This time the strike in question took place on Jan 17 either in South or North Waziristan. Pakistanis officials are insisting that an injured Hakeemullah was taken for medical treatment elsewhere before eventually succumbing to his injuries.

At the time of writing this editorial, there has been no independent verification of Hakeemullah’s death. However, the rumours come at what appears to be a critical time for the TTP. Military operations have resumed in Bajaur Agency, where parts of Mamond and an area near the Pak-Afghan border still have a significant militant presence. Maulana Fazullah and his two senior-most commanders are believed to be in the Mamond area while Pakistan has long argued that the Khan of Kunar is providing sanctuary to militants and allowing them to cross over the Pak-Afghan border and stir up trouble in Bajaur. Why these areas were allowed to fester by the Pakistan Army is not clear (perhaps a premature focus on other areas is to blame) but it seems that this time the army is intent on finishing the job.

Similarly, the few trouble spots in Mohmand Agency may also be cleared soon. Add to this the intelligence and counter-terrorism successes in places like Peshawar, where the rate of suicide and fidayeen attacks has dropped in recent weeks, and Karachi, where big and small militants are frequently being caught, and a picture emerges of the TTP on the back foot — perhaps decisively so.

Of course, North Waziristan looms large and the TTP’s links to the bombing of the CIA’s forward operating base in Khost demonstrates the group’s continuing power to inflict severe damage. And even if Hakeemullah Mehsud is dead, potential leaders such as Waliur Rehman and Qari Husain are waiting in the wings. So the violence is not on the verge of ending; indeed, if Hakeemullah is dead the country will be bracing itself for retaliatory strikes. But neither should the severe damage inflicted on the TTP be underestimated. South Waziristan was the ‘centre of gravity’ and Swat/Malakand division a radical attempt at supplanting the state’s writ in areas outside Fata. Both are no more under the TTP’s control.

In addition, the security forces have disrupted the communications network of the militants, making it more difficult for them to coordinate. All of this has seriously hurt the TTP. However, as we have argued before, lasting gains will only be had if there is success on another front: the capture or elimination of the TTP leadership. The hunt for them must be intensified.