America entered Afghanistan eight years ago to drive out the Taliban. Last week in London the Taliban were being invited, actually importuned, to return and share power. And, what is more, offered $1.5 billion over a five-year period to inveigle them to do so. Nations are entitled to change their minds, but when they adjust their principles some explanation is necessary. There was none in London.

Likewise, eight years ago we were regaled with grainy newsreels of executions of adulterous women by the Taliban in Kabul. Those who wished could also view amputations interspersed with stomach churning accounts and photographs of Taliban beatings and beheadings. Indeed, such was the revulsion generated by the constant projection of these events that even if the Taliban had not suckled Al Qaeda the American invasion seemed justified. Hence, NATO and America were fighting a “just” war and only the most unfeeling could withhold support.

But in London last week, there was hardly a reference in the speeches of Western leaders to the barbaric practices associated with Taliban rule. Nay, these devilish practitioners of perverted Islam were being invited to “reintegrate,” “reconcile” and break bread with the rest of civilised society. It was a volte face that left many speechless. It amounted to the second kind of hypocrisy, the kind that some practice but do not preach, as opposed to the usual variety, which is what some preach but do not practice.

Only last March Obama spoke of an “uncompromising core of the Taliban which must be defeated.” But in London there was no such talk, only an unspoken admission, in the words of one observer, that “the Afghan jihadist movement — in one form or another – will be part of the government in Kabul.” A good example of a truth that was once in favour now being out of favour, which is how Washington defines a complete somersault in policy.

Similarly, it was not long ago that Mr Karzai had scarcely a good word for Pakistan. Just about every major act of terror in Afghanistan was traced back to Pakistan and the ISI. Only the drought in Afghanistan was not our fault. But what did we hear from Karzai in London? The politest of references to Pakistan, and in a mien that was oh-so-gentle and pleasing. And which included an invitation, “particularly (to) Pakistan,” to help in the “process of peace and reconciliation.” A reversal of policy achieved without the slightest inconvenience.

Of course, American officials pretended that they had no idea that Karzai would be making such offers. “We did not know he was going to do it,” said one. “We are not here to discuss reconciliation.” He added: “We are (nevertheless) very happy about ‘reintegration.’ ” And to prove his point he alluded to the fact that “reconciliation” was not mentioned in the final communiqué.

Considering that Karzai does not stir without a phalanx of American minders, and was selected and taught only to think America’s thoughts, the explanation stretched credulity. It also suggested defiance, a quality not usually associated with stooges like Karzai.

According to a prestigious US publication the outcome of the London Conference was “the beginning of the end of the war in Afghanistan.” Perhaps that’s an exaggeration, because there is much ground to traverse, in the form of fighting and also difficult negotiations. However, the London meeting did mark a watershed in the war in Afghanistan — America wants out.

American presidents are ever fearful of doing the sensible thing. The domestic political consequences can be devastating. But Obama has wisely chosen to bite the bullet on Afghanistan because, to quote one of his heroes, Martin Luther King, “Nothing in the world is more dangerous than sincere ignorance and conscientious stupidity.” Both of which were on display in generous measure in the manner that George W Bush conducted policy. No one told Bush that greatness lies not in being strong but in the right use of strength.

Of course, it is far too early to write “finis” to a war that will continue and perhaps intensify as the “surge” gets underway. And by refusing to engage with Karzai the Taliban have ensured that it will be prolonged; so too the Americans by omitting to set a date for their departure. Moreover, an Al Qaeda attack on America, if the attack is traced back to Afghanistan, will complicate the situation and the American occupation may get a second wind. However, Al Qaeda is greatly weakened in Afghanistan. Their leaders are barely operational. An attack on America, therefore, is more likely to be the handiwork of other Al Qaeda platforms, for example, in Yemen, Somalia and Europe.

For Pakistan the days ahead are replete with danger, but also opportunity. The danger springs less from the situation we confront and more from our inner workings, that is, from our meddlesome nature; our yearning to have, if not control of Afghanistan then a decisive say in Afghan attachments; our penchant for one-upmanship and for outwitting other players in Afghanistan.

Already retired soldiers are rubbing their hands with glee at the prospect of Pakistan once again acting as a mentor of the Afghan Taliban and becoming a major player on the Afghan scene, even a game changer. Refusing to accept that they cannot play the role of an arbiter between different groups or opinions in Afghanistan they, nevertheless, relish the opportunity of showing off their absent diplomatic skills. Their pretext is as always “securing our national interests,” their reasons are very different and more sordid.

The fact is that Afghanistan is another country; its people belong to a different society with mores and customs similar but, in many important ways, very different to ours. Islam is less of a binding force between Pakistan and Afghanistan than many concede. In fact, the Islam of the Taliban and that of Pakistan cleave us apart rather than bring us together. Besides, few who have delved in the melange of nationalities and tribes that comprise Afghanistan and all that divides them emerged well off for their efforts.

Our interference in the past earned us nothing but the unremitting hostility of the Tajik dominated Northern Alliance, a proxy war with Iran, the distrust of the Central Asian Republics and Russia and, eventually, the re-emergence of Indian influence at the initiative of those who had resented our interference and the support we extended to their opponents.

On the other hand, acting as a facilitator, providing help and logistical support as needed — or counsel, if and when requested — and showing impartiality when it comes to dealing with the Afghan protagonists, is a better course. But offering our good offices before the Afghan Taliban have agreed to engage in negotiations is clearly out of the question. It was, therefore, gratifying to learn that Mr Gilani had rejected Karzai’s offer for mediation on the grounds that “Pakistan does not believe in meddling in the affairs of other countries.”

Pakistan’s Afghan policy would best be formulated, conducted and implemented by a mixed civilian-military team, and not exclusively, as in the past, by the military. Leaving it solely to the military arouses every feeling except trust. Besides, on their own, neither has the requisite knowledge or skills; hence, neither should have exclusive say in the counsels of government.

Similarly the success of the army in warding off the extremists will be of no avail if it is not accompanied by a jointly agreed civil-military strategy to engage with the TTP. It should be one that knows the limitations of force, because “one must know when to blend force with a manoeuvre, a blow with an agreement.” Winning the peace is more important than winning the war.

The writer is a former ambassador. Email: charles123it@hotmail.com