Syed Talat Hussain

Now we know that Delhi’s recent conduct has been an honest depiction of its actual intent and its durable, if not immutable, goals towards Pakistan. It is clear that meaningful engagement with Islamabad on the basis of parity, and with the aim to create regional peace to the equal benefit of Pakistan, is not part of Delhi’s designs

Should Pakistan talk to India or
should it not? Of course it should, but not now. Not so hurriedly. Since the Mumbai attacks, our position has been that Delhi’s pre-conditioning of the Composite Dialogue’s resumption with arbitrary demands cannot be the way forward. We have also been holding the logical line that India’s off-again-on-again attitude undermines serious efforts for lasting peace. We have rightly pointed the international community’s attention towards Delhi’s poisonous presence in Afghanistan, and have repeatedly underlined elaborate stratagems Delhi plans and executes in Fata and Balochistan. This policy stance has not been a mere reaction to India’s post-Mumbai unreasonableness. Deeper issues have recently surfaced to expose the nature of Indian diplomacy towards Pakistan.

In all these crucial few months, when domestic terrorism was exploding in our face and the Fata insurgency seemed to stretch the armed forces across the western border, Delhi mounted a most formidable offensive against Pakistan. It scaled up tensions all round. It ran a vicious campaign to make posters out of Pakistan’s image as a failing state. (Some of its star analysts and frontline journalists have been marking dates by which Pakistan would cease to exist as a viable state.) Delhi’s policy makers, through statements and actions, ensured that a Damocles sword always hung over Islamabad. They threatened that a final and decisive war against Pakistan could be imposed on the flimsiest of excuses. Delhi upgraded the mantra of ‘another Mumbai-like incident causing war’ to the level of a doctrine. Through sizzling rhetoric and passionate Pakistan-bashing, Delhi’s decision makers — across party lines — created a domestic atmosphere that was akin to George Bush’s propaganda outreach before the Iraq war, where nearly 87 percent Americans lapped up the official line that Saddam Hussein had something to do with the 9/11 attacks. And as if to lay the hateful message thicker still, Delhi kicked the nation’s pride right between the wickets in the IPL, bowling out clean whatever chances there were of convincing the Pakistani people that at least cricket was above diplomatic foul play. This was India’s real Pakistan policy in full swing.

Now we know that Delhi’s recent conduct has been an honest depiction of its actual intent and its durable, if not immutable, goals towards Pakistan. It is clear that meaningful engagement with Islamabad on the basis of parity, and with the aim to create regional peace to the equal benefit of Pakistan, is not part of Delhi’s designs. Delhi wants to weave Pakistan into a relationship where its desires dictate the terms of diplomacy. A relationship of complete inequality is what Delhi seeks, both in the theatre of conflict and in the parley halls. Co-option, coercion, dialogue, stalemate, resumption, disruption, war and peace — Delhi wants to be the sole arbiter of all these choices when it comes to dealing with Pakistan.

In view of these hard realities, it would be too simplistic for Pakistan to accept the Indian offer of talks, something we are most likely to do. This will confirm the fact that Delhi holds the strings of dialogue, which it loosens and tightens at will. This will also confirm the thesis that post-Mumbai we have learnt no lessons from our extreme exposure to the core of India’s policy towards Pakistan. It will also prove that our claims of being consistent and firm in dealing with India are just declarations. That in reality we don’t mind being played by Delhi. Willingly.

This is not to say that we should be neglectful of the dilemmas we face. And some of these are really acute. How to avoid spiralling tensions with India and yet not become, in the name of talks, the proverbial mouse caught up with a big cat? How to sustain Pakistan’s declared policy of resumption of Composite Dialogue and yet spurn the Indian handshake? How to stay prepared for the blowback of US operations in Afghanistan across our north-to-south western sector and at the same time keep the forces battle-ready on a tense eastern border?

Under these circumstances, an appropriate response to the Indian offer has to be a heavily qualified yes — a yes that should take its time before resuming face-to-face negotiations. First, the context in which talks resumption is to be pursued has to be spelled out. For Pakistan, this context is based on three simple yardsticks: one is the standpoint from which India is showing interest in the renewal of talks; two is the likely outcome for Pakistan of the resumption of dialogue; and three the guarantees international interlocutors — Washington and London — are furnishing about keeping the Indian behaviour steady on the path of long-term and purposeful engagement.

Official circles are hopeful that Delhi’s mood has changed. This is too good to be true. We would have to be tone-deaf to miss Delhi’s refrain on terrorism. Moreover, there is no evidence on the ground that signals Delhi’s plans in Afghanistan being adjusted to address Pakistan’s deep concerns. And at any rate, these plans will not change: these have been conceived with a long view and, unlike our goalposts which move backwards and forwards all the time, these are fixed in the future.

Just as misleading are the so-called assurances that international powerbrokers may have rendered to convince Pakistan to sit round the negotiating table. If not committed in public, these assurances have no meaning or impact. These are mere good words, which can be taken back as easily as they roll off those slippery tongues. This highlights the most important point: if India is unwilling to drop even a symbolic hint about a change of heart, and if the world has nothing better to offer than privately expressed intent to “work its influence with Delhi”, what interest of Pakistan’s is served by jumping on the table for talks? Obviously none.

India has spat on dialogue with Pakistan for nearly a year and a half. It has created problems for Pakistan in the worst of times and in the worst possible way, but somehow the country has muddled through. Now that organised domestic terrorism is waning, and the world is ever more cooperating with Pakistan to stabilise Afghanistan, Islamabad can afford to, not spit, but perhaps sit on the talks offer for a few months. Islamabad should wait and see what actions Delhi takes to create an enabling environment for making these talks meaningful. If we care to read time correctly, and on our own watch, it is on our side. Delhi has to do more than just express intent for the talks to begin. Without verifiable evidence of change in Delhi’s actions, resuming dialogue will be no more than a familiar walk up the path to nowhere.

The writer is a leading Pakistani journalist