Munir Attaullah

Unlike our Supreme Court that has given its own unique meaning to what the simple English word ‘consultation’ implies, I am a simple sort who, when our COAS talks of ‘strategic depth’ thinks only of our disastrous policy of old by that description

By the time you read this column I will be in Beirut. With the news on the home front for some time now being nothing if not consistently dismal and depressing, I need to get away to saner pastures for a refreshing break.

There is the dreadful return of mindless, effortless, and even mysterious carnage in Karachi, the fulcrum of our economy (which itself is recovering — if at all — far too slowly for anyone’s liking). The COAS has publicly reiterated our army’s continued commitment to the concept of ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan. And there is plenty of rhetoric signalling our new and increasingly hardline approach towards India. The cricket team’s tour ‘down under’ was a fiasco. And the born-again, rejuvenated higher judiciary (for I am not sure if the lower echelons have changed much) is doing what experience tells us the freshly reconverted bring to their faith: the excessive and ostentatious display of righteous, crusading zeal.

And that is by no means all. I continue to be deeply frustrated in my search (admittedly a half-hearted one) for any person who has actually seen Dr D & G smile — even fleetingly. Meanwhile, week after week, and in every single programme of his, this master of the grand moral narrative (volubly supported by an easily predictable select cast of like-minded well-known earnest media personalities) valiantly continues with what are by now stale reworked episodes of his drama serial with the NRO theme.

The beleaguered president (and others) is definitely going by… — well, rest assured, they will now be going as soon as… — I mean, they may miraculously be still hanging on cussedly, but in the inevitable institutional clash this will produce, the judiciary and the army will surely jointly force them out. I mean it is incomprehensible why this still has not happened, but think of it as the lull before the actual storm. I mean, dammit, I do not understand why no one seems to be taking me and the ghareeb awam seriously but surely, at the very least, it is morally incumbent upon them, etc, etc.

From one end of the spectrum to the other: talking of the man with the perpetual frown reminds me of another anchor from the same leading channel. I refer, of course, to the host of a much beloved online religious programme, the man with the widest permanent smirk of smug self-satisfaction, and the most ingratiating manner, south of the North Pole.

I note that this gentleman, who once publicly proclaimed on his programme that members of a certain religious community are wajib-al-qatl (is that not open incitement to murder?), is still going strong and still using the title ‘Dr’, long after being exposed. Should not the prestigious media group that employs him — vociferous as it is in demanding accountability and high moral standards from others — be applying those same principles in its own backyard?

And, if this litany is not depressing enough, I seem to have again lost my putting stroke!

But, for an optimist like me, depressing news is not the same as despairing news. Take, for example, the problem of my putting woes. My plan is to get in touch with Tiger (who appears to be currently in hiding) and invite him to Beirut as my guest. There, in return for secretly providing him the sort of R & R he reputedly enjoys, I can hope for the odd free putting lesson.

And yet, on all those issues of public importance that I mentioned, I do sometimes quietly despair for a number of reasons. For, it sometimes seems to me the problems we now face are of a magnitude and complexity that defy any short-term sensible solution. The best we can realistically hope for are partial palliatives, and measures to prevent matters just totally spinning out of control.

Take the Karachi violence. To a certain extent the nexus between politics and various criminal mafias that underlies it is the type of problem we see everywhere in most third world mega-cities. Such problems are not about to go away. But in our case there is more. To start with, no general policy to disarm the populace (or even to strictly control the carrying of firearms) can hope to succeed where weapons are easily and cheaply available (and licenses liberally dispensed by the government). Then there is the ever smouldering and deadly sectarian strife. Finally, let us not forget the possibility of easy influx into the city in large numbers of displaced Afghans, our own Taliban types, and other al Qaeda acolytes. The authorities are, and likely will remain for a long time, largely helpless against such uncontrolled forces of destabilisation.

Consider next the mindset of the army, as articulated by the COAS. Incidentally, it should now be clear to even a moron that GHQ has — slowly, incrementally, shrewdly but surely — succeeded through adroit manoeuvring in wresting back from the civilian government whatever little control over foreign policy the civilians dreamed they possessed (by virtue of being a democratically elected government). All the vital policy decisions on the western front are now decided directly between GHQ and the Pentagon (with even the State Department and Holbrooke largely sidelined). As for India, forget hopes for an early detente. It is back to a display of the mailed fist (and the claim that we have forced the Indians back to the negotiation table is cited as a triumph for this policy).

I do not deny that Afghanistan presents us with a set of fiendishly complex and difficult — perhaps even impossible — policy dilemmas. Unlike our Supreme Court that has given its own unique meaning to what the simple English word ‘consultation’ implies, I am a simple sort who, when our COAS talks of ‘strategic depth’ thinks only of our disastrous policy of old by that description.

Sure, the Western powers will gradually withdraw: long-term, why should they care if the Afghans want to continue — as they likely will — their internecine wars for another few generations? Certainly, a political power sharing agreement between rival groups, guaranteed by the West and the regional powers, and underpinned by money, a 150,000 strong Afghan National Army and some Western military presence is an unlikely stable recipe. Sure, of all the regional powers we have the biggest stake by far in a stable Afghanistan. But should all that mean we should again work towards a unified (eventually, by force) Afghanistan under the Taliban sponsored by us so that we ‘control’ that country?

I fear that this is the sort thinking that will eventually provide not us but the Taliban with ‘strategic depth’ inside Pakistan, right up to the Indus and even beyond. Better to integrate our frontier regions with the rest of Pakistan as quickly as possible, put in place a tight and effective border regime and let the Pakhtuns and the rest of the Afghans sort out their own affairs themselves.

As for the much hyped by the media tussle between the government and the Supreme Court, I propose to discuss that next week. But I will say one thing here and now. Why is it that everybody talks about the government ‘defying’ and ‘confronting’ the Supreme Court? Is it not possibly the case that it is the other way around?

Firmly brushing aside such thoughts, I contemplate instead the pleasing prospect of winning a few dollars on the Baccarat table at The Casino de Liban.

The writer is a businessman. A selection of his columns is now available in book form. Visit munirattaullah.com