While Pakistan is in the midst of a full-blown political crisis, the security situation, which had reached its worst point in April 2009, when the Pakistani version of the Taliban took over Swat and adjacent areas, has taken a turn for the better after the military’s success in counter-insurgency.

The abject surrender by the National Assembly in sanctioning, almost without debate, that the Taliban could administer territory where the laws of Pakistan would not apply, came to its natural conclusion in April 2009, when Sufi Muhammad proclaimed that he did not believe in the Constitution, or the Supreme Court of Pakistan or the High Courts.

From here on, in terms of the “domino theory,” it was only a matter of time before the precedent was emulated in other areas in Pakistan. Sufi Muhammad’s brutal son-in-law Fazlullah proceeded to enforce his own brand of Islam over the hapless people of Swat.

What the army has done in Swat, and since than in South Waziristan Agency, has been nothing short of magnificent, though at grievous human cost to itself. A calculated risk was taken in surrendering the element of surprise and announcing the military operations in advance, which created a mass exodus of two-million-plus internally displaced persons. This substantially limited the civilian collateral damage, preventing it turning into the tragedy it could have become. Using overwhelming force the army raced against time to accomplish in six weeks what most military analysts had expected would take six months, or even longer. Within two months most IDPs were back. These tactics were duplicated again in mid-October against the fortified Al-Qaeda stronghold in South Waziristan. With underground tunnels for storage of arms, ammunition and explosives, and for field hospitals, these militant bases were considered impregnable. The denial of such space has made militant leaders vulnerable, Mullah Baradar’s recent capture in Karachi being a case in point. Our military planners should be satisfied that Gen Stanley McChrystal is following the same tactics in Morjah in Helmand province, publicly announcing impending military operations to contain civilian collateral damage while dominating space, an absolute must in trying to win the hearts and minds of the populace.

The change in military command in November 2007 changed the military mindset from its comfortable peacetime ceremonial role, a 180-degree turnaround in transforming themselves mentally to take on the mission. Democracy (of sorts) gave the army the public support that is a necessity in counter-insurgences, without that the military effort could never have succeeded.

Countering insurgency is far different from countering terrorism. We do not have the capacity or the capability within the civilian law enforcement agencies to counter terrorism. Alienating the population in such an exercise, the army will lose the goodwill it has gained through great sacrifice. Because of Shia-Sunni trouble, the Afghan War and the freedom struggle in Kashmir, militants have strong roots in many urban and rural areas throughout Pakistan. Terrorist cells of many different kinds proliferate throughout the country. Money, material and human resources abound in quite some numbers, it will take dedicated and concentrated effort by a wholly separate entity, well-equipped, well-trained and well-led, to destroy their capacity and potential to spread harm and grief.

In the 1980s and 90s poppy cultivation and drug smuggling across the Durand Line had become a menace to the state. Set up with the help of the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) has had phenomenal success targeting drug lords and dismantling their vast empires. Having its own inherent intelligence setup, the ANF should be fast-tracked into the nucleus of a Counter-Terrorism Force (CTF). Since drug money plays a big part in sustaining terrorist forces, and organised crime-skills are necessary to obtain fake documents, money-laundering, etc., there is an unholy nexus with terrorism that makes the ANF route a potent one.

When Zardari tried to prevent the restoration of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, the streets supported the lawyers in taking up the challenge. Defiantly posturing that he would never back down in the face of the “long march,” on March 15, 2009, Zardari did just that. Zardari’s worst fears came true nine months later. His incumbency has been thrown into doubt, with the restored Supreme Court declaring the National Reconciliation Ordinance null and void ab initio. This judgment reopened all corruption cases against Zardari and the small clique that controls the PPP. On Saturday, Feb 13, 2010, the notification of judges’ appointment became a test case of will.

Aside from the great danger posed by terrorism, Pakistan is now faced with another debilitating confrontation, that between the presidency and a resurgent superior judiciary bent upon imposing the rule of law. For once the army, despite many attempts by Zardari and his cronies to bait it to come into the fray, is staying on the sidelines. In the meantime, the legal countdown has begun.

Having met a cross-section of the world elite as well as the common man over the last three weeks, in the World Economic Forum (WEF) at Davos, in the US and subsequently during the “Worldwide Security Conference” in Brussels, one can say the unanimous view is that Zardari is corrupt. Some say it vehemently and some with indifference (and hypocrisy) that there are many other corrupt leaders in the Third World. Having declared the NRO illegal, why is the Supreme Court silent on his eligibility for the presidency? Why not focus on this critical point alone? Everything else, thereafter, becomes infructuous! One thing is certain. There is no danger to democracy, or even to the Gilani government. As a political animal the Honourable PM may blow hot and cold, but he will not commit hara-kiri by taking on the Supreme Court.

Richard Wagner’s famous quartet of operas, “The Ring of the Nibelung,” was completed in 1876. The last opera’s name, “Gotterdammerung,” as used in English, refers to a disastrous conclusion of events.

Zardari has let it be known he will go down in the full glare of the International media if the Supreme Court opts to requisition support under Article 190 of the Constitution. Will Pakistan go down in flames along with this man’s presidency? Not likely. On the Ides of March 2009, Zardari blinked despite all his bravado and bluster. He will do again what he is best at, withdraw the notification and thus try and gain time. Can Pakistan continue to be in a state of limbo and, while Zardari (and cronies) play one “card” after the other, be subject to debilitating crisis time and again?

(Extracts from the talk given at International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague on Feb 16.)

The writer is a defence and political analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com