Examining the Radicalization of Chechen Separatists During the Resistance Movement
Introduction
The Chechen people have endured a long history of aggression, culminating at the end of the twentieth century during which a separatist struggle against Russia began, triggering the First Chechen War in 1994. At the onset of the Second Chechen War however, it became apparent that Chechens were engaging in a different kind of warfare. In September of 1999, over 300 people were killed when Chechen terrorists destroyed apartment complexes in Moscow, Buinaksk, and Volgondosk. In 2002 and 2004, terrorists took hostages in a Moscow theater and in a middle school in Beslan, resulting in enormous massacres. While Boris Yeltsin started the First Chechen war with the aim of quelling separatism, Vladimir Putin shifted the aim during the Second Chechen War to fighting Russia’s own “war on terror.”
To the Chechen people, the existence of their national identity, strongly intertwined with their Islamic faith, was being threatened. Part of the population succumbed to extremism, seeing brutal combat as the sole method of obtaining their objectives. The origins of this shift will be closely analyzed to clarify the misconceptions that have been purported by the Russian government and other intellectuals. Scholars have contended that radicalization developed out of Russian aggression during the First Chechen War. However, this represents a simplistic view of the conflict, neglecting to carefully examine all of the variables involved in the radical transformation. It is improbable that Russian aggression was the sole factor for the development of extremism, as this perception fails to acknowledge the intervention of outside actors and the intra-Chechen power struggle, as well as other factors that were present during both wars.
Politicization of Islam
Scholars have purported that radicalization was in part due to the indissoluble bond between Islam and Chechen national identity, which has gradually strengthened over the course of the history. Starting from when Islam first came to the North Caucasus in the seventeenth century, a strong connection grew, and it became central in Chechen nationalism. Katrien Hertog (2005) provides a beneficial analysis of the beginnings of Chechen identity through her research. She postulates that during the two hundred years of Chechen resistance that began in the eighteenth century, the role of Islam grew more powerful in times of conflict with the Russian empire. In the years of resistance, groups of brotherhoods used jihad against Russia as a means to instate sharia law in the region. In response, Russia endeavored to subdue the brotherhoods, causing them to acquire an ideology of resistance that remained with them up until present times. From the start of the Soviet Union up until just before its collapse, religion was banned and so Chechens were forced to practice Islam behind closed doors.
However, Islam flourished during this period and Chechens constantly resisted pressure to practice atheism under communist law. It was under the last decades of communism that the marriage between Islam and national identity occurred: during the 1970s and the 1980s religion, ethnic pride, anticommunism and anti-Russian feelings became so interlinked and mutually reinforcing among Chechens that it is impossible to separate one attitudinal strand from another (Hertog, 2005, para. 247). During the years of perestroika, the ban on Islam was lifted and Chechens were able to attend services and practice freely, although they became discriminated against for doing so. Although the Russian government has claimed that Islam and politics were merged from the beginning, since perestroika, Islam has remained outside of the political processes during the pre-war period, with the exception of two political parties, even though one did not have enough votes to enter the national congress and the other was never officially registered (Hertog, 2005, para. 240).
It was under the threat of the 1994 war that this relationship between nationalism and religion became central in politics. Chechen leaders and warlords created narratives on national identity, using Islam to mobilize the civilian population in the struggle against Russia. These narratives played on the emotions of the population by making historical references to the religious and resistance wars of the past, leading to radicalization and the popularity of extremist views. As Emil Souleimanov (2005) states, in the Chechen mindset, a war against an external (Russian) aggressor is almost automatically associated with a war for territory, freedom, national honor, identity, and religion (p. 53). The leadership also relied upon the use of Islamic slogans to arouse the population into violence against Russia. Scholars report that it was solely through this close relationship between Islam and Chechen national identity that warlords were able to amass such radical support and carry out terrorist acts. However, Aurélie Campana (2006) has disagreed with this claim, as her research has postulated that warlords mobilized the population in order to achieve military and political goals and that most Chechens have expressed disgust over the use of terrorism (p. 137). Although research has shown that the number of civilians that were actually mobilized by these warlords is relatively small, their objective in recruiting fighters was successful regardless.
Antagonism from Russian Governance
While some scholars have maintained that the politicization of Islam was the main cause of Chechen radicalization, others believe it came out of the horrors and brutality that the population faced under Russian governance. Faced with the perseverance to maintain Chechnya, Russia used brutal tactics during the first war, radicalizing and unifying the Chechen population against it. Instilled in the Chechen national identity is the horrific mass deportation that was endured under Stalin in 1944, in which the whole population was expelled to Central Asia for their alleged cooperation with the Germans during the Second World War, even though this claim was largely false. According to Souleimanov (2005), during the First Chechen War, 35,000 to 100,000 civilians were estimated to have died (p. 48). The infrastructure and economy were obliterated, and public order broke down almost entirely.
The reconstruction effort needed was massive, yet financial assistance and crucial resources were never received except for energy supplies and grain, resulting in the region descending into a state of disorder and lawlessness (Kramer, 2005, para. 210). Widespread poverty ensued, and high levels of unemployment among young adults, resulting in what Domitilla Sagramoso (2007) has described as “the resentment and disposition of people to violent political action when they share a sense that they have been deprived of economic opportunities or political advantages enjoyed by other groups (p. 690).” Russian troops engaged in systematic human rights abuses, including torture, rape, forced disappearances, mass arrest operations, kidnapping, and summary executions (Kramer, 2005, para. 214). As a result of these acts of horror, many saw no other option than to engage in illegal activities such as arms trafficking and kidnappings as a method of obtaining ransoms (Souleimanov, 2005, para. 49). Overall, it is obvious that Russian governance was ineffective and resulted in the alienation of the Chechen population from the rest of Russia, deepening separatist feelings and leading a section of the population to embrace violence as the only solution.
The Role of Foreign Fighters
Another group of scholars has stressed the role of foreign fighters from the Middle East in the Chechen conflict for the prevalence of extremist views. Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty (2008) have conducted extensive research looking at the scope of foreign fighters present in Chechnya, in addition to their relationship with terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. Foreign fighters can be described as “individual Muslims who make a conscious decision to join a grouping that is fighting occupation and/or aspiring for self-governance that denies their current national identity” (Moore & Tumelty, 2008, p. 414). Foreign fighters became widespread after the 1980s through the experience of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, in which Islamist extremists worldwide identified with the ensuing conflict, motivating them to fight. During the First Chechen War, Shayk Fathi, a Jordanian Chechen, was one of the first compelled to go to Chechnya to help with their separatist struggle. There, he created an Islamic Assembly, gaining support and calling on the Chechens to wage jihad against Russia. Fathi then invited Amir Khattab, a Saudi-Afghan who had fought as a mujahideen in Afghanistan. Khattab built strong military links between foreign fighters and nationalist Chechens. Once he declared Chechnya appropriate for jihad, he won acceptance from the resistance movement and formed a close relationship with Shamil Basayev, leader of the Chechen resistance movement. In total, approximately eighty Arabs fought during the first war, as well as a small number of North Africans, Turks, and Central Asians. Following the end of the first war and the several years of de facto independence from 1996 to 1999, Khattab aspired for the creation of an Islamic state in Chechnya and established training camps where young adults took courses in religion and received military training (Kramer, 2005, para. 212).
The connection between Al Qaeda and the foreign fighters was exaggerated by the Putin administration, who following September 11th, wanted to find common ground with the new Bush administration. The Russians proposed that Khattab was working directly for Al Qaeda after US intelligence discovered his name on a document in Afghanistan linking him to Al Qaeda. However, in reality the document was just a list of Afghan foreign fighters (Moore & Tumelty, 2008, para. 420). Khattab had ideological differences with Al Qaeda and they saw him as uncooperative with their agenda. While it is true that there were some fighters in Chechnya that had links to Al Qaeda, most fighters had fixed themselves to Khattab’s strict agenda and did not deviate from it. Surprisingly, Khattab sought to regulate the number of foreign fighters coming to Chechnya after the beginning of the second war, as many were poorly trained and could drain vital resources. However, some foreign fighters did eventually become apart of Al Qaeda, including two of the September 11th hijackers (Moore & Tumelty, 2008, para. 423).
During the Second Chechen War, it became clear the methods of the Chechen fighters had become much more extreme compared to the first, utilizing suicide attacks and hostage taking. In all of the four major terrorist incidents during the second war, the involvement of Arab Muslims has been confirmed. However, their involvement was largely seen as a way to attract financial support from the Middle East, and the Chechen fighters were the ones responsible for the implementation and planning of the attacks. Although foreign fighters did play a role in radicalization of the Chechens through raising funds and providing training, the connection between them has proven to be less than alleged by the Russian government and other intellectuals. Moore and Tumelty (2008) state, “the adoption of comparatively extreme methods during the second war is symptomatic of the changing nature of the indigenous resistance and the society of which it is a product, as opposed to increasing Arab influence” (p. 425).
Ineffectiveness of the Chechen Leadership
The last school of thought concerning the radicalization of the Chechens points to the ineffectiveness of the Chechen authorities and the intra-Chechen conflict that ensued after the first war. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a power vacuum in the North Caucasus in which no stable authority was able to govern effectively. By the end of the First Chechen War in 1996, it was apparent that an intra-elite struggle for power was developing between the newly elected moderate president Aslan Maskhadov and other extremist commanders such as Basaev and Khattab. Not only did Maskhadov face a power struggle, but he was left with the reconstruction of Chechnya almost entirely. The president was loosing credibility as Basaev had been gaining power and was allied with a majority of the Islamists. He was also unable to disarm the militant groups following the end of the first war and so they continued to take hostages for ransom.
According to Sagramoso (2007), the inability of Maskhadov to achieve the “monopoly of the legitimate use of force in a territory”, a key condition to achieve statehood, resulted in the withdrawal of many international organizations from Chechnya, further deteriorating the post-war environment (p. 97). This inability led to the split between Islamist fundamentalists allied with Basaev, and separatists allied with Maskhadov. Young Chechens preferred Basaev’s simple religious message to Maskhadov’s practices based in secular customary law. Ensuing, was a generational division between those brought up under the Soviet Union and those born after 1980 (Moore & Tumelty, 2008, para. 415). Fearing a civil war, Hughes (2007) believes that Maskhadov did not confront Basaev but stood by as they gained more power (p. 102). This incapacity to reconcile between the two Chechen groups led to the popularity of Basaev and Khattab and their extremist tactics.
Analysis
After exploring the many variables affecting the radicalization of the Chechen resistance movement, it has become clear that it did not evolve solely out of Russian aggression during the First Chechen War, as some scholars contend. It is evident that the relationship that developed centuries ago between Islam and Chechen nationalism became increasingly stronger as Russian brutality occurred during the 1944 deportation and the Soviet years of religious oppression. This relationship was then exploited by warlords trying to garner support for a more extreme resistance movement and Islamic slogans were used to convince the civilian population. Hertog’s (2005) analysis of the politicization of Islam is effective in proving this connection, even though the number of Chechens who went along with the rationale of the warlords was fewer than originally thought. The politicization of Islam happened recently and therefore was not something already a part of Chechnya, but rather grew out of the conflict. The connection between terrorist groups and the Chechen extremists has also been less close then thought, although it is clear that foreign fighters did play a role, albeit a minor one, in the training of Chechens who had already been carried away with the extremist movement. Thus, the role of the foreign fighters was more supportive than a direct cause in the radicalization. Hughes’ examination of the intra-Chechen struggle has also proved to be an important factor in the popularity of the extremist movement. The other camp allied with Maskhadov was unable to control the movement and he was inevitably blamed for the failure to reconstruct the republic, leading to the outbreak of the Second War. This factor has also been confirmed to play a lesser role, as it led to the popularity of extremist views but was not a defining factor that caused radicalization.
Conclusion
The radicalization of the Chechen resistance movement was directly instigated by the politicization of Islam and antagonism from Russian governance, while being supported by the presence of foreign fighters and the ineffectiveness of the Chechen leadership. From this analysis, it is clear that radicalization was a gradual process, but one that involved many different factors that transformed the separatist conflict into jihad. The two hundred year long history of brutality under Russian rule and intertwinement of Islam and Chechen national identity allowed warlords to amass support in their struggle against Russia. Foreign fighters in Afghanistan found sympathy in the Chechen struggle and relocated there to assist in the training of fighters and the channeling of funds from the Middle East. Although some of the foreign fighters were affiliated with Al Qaeda, the terrorist organization was not responsible for the implantation and planning of the conflict. The incapacity of the Chechen leadership to govern led to the further support for the extremists, and ultimately closed the door in Chechen independence forever.
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Mohammed Abbasi 
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