Two important Taliban leaders were detained in Pakistan in the past one month. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and Mullah Abdul Salam, the first in Karachi and the other in Faisalabad. The arrests coincided with the launching of a major offensive by the Nato forces in Marjah, in Afghanistan’s Helmand province, a stronghold of the Taliban. Since details about how and when these detentions took place are seldom revealed by official circles, one has to rely on media reports, which are not always accurate and generally based on speculation.

However, these arrests may help in changing the perceptions of the West about Pakistan-Taliban relations. Doubts were always expressed on Pakistan’s handling of the Afghan Taliban, not only by outside elements but also internally. There is a widespread impression that Pakistani intelligence agencies and security establishment are pro-Taliban and events taking place in the country are with the approval of local intelligence elements.

The whole story about the rise of the Taliban in 1994 is based on half-truths, fiction or speculations. The role of the ISI and government functionaries then at the helm of affairs has been exaggerated to some extent. The rise of the Taliban was never a planned strategy. They are the product of circumstances. The other actors were activated when Kandahar was captured by the Taliban in November 1994.

So, strictly speaking, the Taliban movement is not the brainchild of one institution, as generally believed. After the Taliban’s initial success, plans were formulated by the Pakistani security establishment to exploit the potential of this force to control Afghanistan, something the Afghan Mujahideen factions had failed to achieve even six years after the Russian troops withdrawal.

Since its independence Pakistan has had issues with Afghanistan, the only country which voted against Pakistan’s entry into the UN. The Durand Line treaty defining the British-Afghan boundaries was signed in 1893. It was ratified twice by successive Afghan governments. However, once the British left the subcontinent the Afghan government laid claim to the Pakhtun areas of Pakistan, arguing that following the departure of the British the treaty was no longer valid. Pakistan, on the other hand, refuted this claim as the people of NWFP voted to join Pakistan through a referendum at the time of partition.

Pakistan, during all this time, showed restraint and patience and all its policies were focused on India since it did not want to open another front on its western border. Afghanistan also reciprocated and during the 1965 and 1971 war, the 7th Infantry Division was moved from Peshawar to the eastern front and Afghanistan did not take advantage of an unguarded border. In 1976 Prime Minister Bhutto and President Daud held meaningful negotiations on improving relations between the two countries. However, before the foreign policy roadmap could be implemented, Mr Bhutto’s government was overthrown by Zia. The history of jihad during the Zia regime is well known.

From 1947 to 1992, for obvious reasons, India had more influence in Afghanistan as compared to Pakistan. The Pakistani security establishment went all-out to support the jihad, presuming that ultimately Pakistan will have a friendly dispensation in Afghanistan and the Pakhtunistan issue will be buried forever. They did not visualise the impact and effects of the Afghan jihad on the internal social structure of Pakistan, which had been a liberal country prior to the Afghan jihad and the Zia era. The advantage Pakistan received during Taliban rule was that Indian influence was diluted to a great extent and New Delhi had no say in the affairs of Afghanistan.

After 9/11 the US administration did not take into consideration the sensitivities of Pakistan regarding Indian presence in Afghanistan. The US can never win the war on terror without the active support and assistance of Pakistan. This is a geographical reality. The Indians were allowed to open four consulates in Afghanistan. Though in a normal environment this may have been a routine diplomatic activity but the US and Afghan governments did not visualise the concerns of the Pakistani security establishment.

The role of these consulates is being viewed with distrust by the media and civil society and the average Pakistani is not prepared to believe that these are normal diplomatic missions. The general perception is that these consulates have been established to launch agents for the destabilisation of Pakistan. This perception is widespread and the number of consulates is being exaggerated, and these diplomatic missions are being accused of destabilisation of the country and helping anti-Pakistan elements, specifically in Balochistan.

With this background the arrests of these important Taliban leaders should be analysed. Pakistan proved its seriousness to fight the war on terror as a close ally immediately after 9/11. The army was moved to administratively inaccessible areas of Tirah, and to Khyber and Kurram Agencies in 2001. A large number of AL Qaeda members were arrested by Pakistani intelligence and security forces. The madrasa of Jalaluddin Haqqani in Miranshah was raided thrice in 2002 and 2003. Sirajuddin Haqqani was reportedly injured in a raid conducted in June 2002 in South Waziristan. Raids were conducted against all the prominent Afghan Taliban leaders whenever some intelligence information was received.

Those who allege that Pakistan is not serious in taking on the Taliban have not produced any evidence to substantiate their allegations. Pakistan realises that Taliban activities affect local tribes too and create an internal security threat to the country. Pakistani forces have conducted more operations against terrorists and have suffered more casualties than Nato forces have.

However, with Obama’s plan of withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2011, Pakistan has to make some readjustments in her Afghan policy. Pakistan would not like a hostile government in Kabul once Nato forces withdraw from Afghanistan. Pakistan would like to be a part of any negotiations held with the Taliban. Pakistan would like to be consulted in any new arrangements planned for Kabul in a post withdrawal scenario. Pakistan, for internal security reasons, may not like Afghanistan to return to a system of government which was in place in the pre-9/11 environment.

Pakistan would also want the Durand Line issue to be resolved before the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan. These are the likely objectives which Pakistan would like to achieve, and the recent detentions of the Taliban leaders in no way indicate that there is a shift in Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan.

The writer is a retired brigadier. Email: asadmunir38@yahoo.com