Shahzad Chaudhry:

There is an inherent proclivity within the Pakistani civil society and political elites to appear progressive and liberated through seeking fraternal relations with India. This is more of a reactive impulse to the overbearing and dominating position that the Pakistani establishment tends to hold over the Pakistani state structures

India and Pakistan still reside in mediaeval times. Their responses are primordial, at least in interacting with each other, and no amount of education, progress and foresight dents the naturally held instinct. This, in fact, is a fit case for an anthropologic study: how do humans behave carnivorous at times when still appearing normal in all other facets of human existence? It is abominable, shameful and utterly gutter mindset.

They met at Delhi after 14 months of recalcitrance, with many of us going hee-haw over realism finally dawning upon the subcontinent. Many felt that India had finally realised the futility of the no-talks strategy; that India sensed being left out in the cold when some most essential issues on Afghanistan’s future are about to be decided; and that perhaps some American influence may have finally nudged India to agree to talks with Pakistan. While the first two dwell around India’s own interests and are linked to how it wishes to pursue its regional goals, the last leaves an uncomfortable allusion that talks with India are something that Pakistan seeks per se.

Pakistan has only itself to blame for such an implicit assumption. The extra keenness that the Pakistani leadership showed in their initial interaction with the Indians to win peace at all costs placed them at a certain perspective vis-à-vis the Indians that was less than salutary; they seemed dependent, unsure and weak. Their interlocutors greatly exploited this vulnerability and pushed Pakistan to such a position that soon became untenable with the larger security balance of interaction between the two nations.

There is an inherent proclivity within the Pakistani civil society and political elites to appear progressive and liberated through seeking fraternal relations with India. This is more of a reactive impulse to the overbearing and dominating position that the Pakistani establishment, both the military and the civil bureaucracy, tends to hold over the Pakistani state structures. The Pakistani establishment is deliberate, cautious and mostly plays safe in assuming a position on India, as indeed is the case with the Indian establishment. Whatever be the origin of the elite impulse for fraternisation, it tends to sit at variance with the larger national sentiment, and is the main source of the uncertainty that is seen as fickle responses of the interlocutors when establishments of both countries engage in parleys. That is why there tends to be a louder refrain that sans the establishment trappings, the political leadership tends to cover a greater distance when left entirely on their own in any such interaction.

In its current form, Pakistan is perhaps at its weakest on many counts in such an envisaged interaction. Internationally, Pakistan is perceived more as part of the problem than the solution, though in recent weeks this may have begun to change somewhat. Domestically, Pakistan’s internal polity, leadership, governance, and all other indicators of societal stability are at their poorest; while its economy is stagnant and on drip-feed to survive. Militarily and notionally the state is stretched to its utmost limit. In such a state of relative weakness, there is more for Pakistan to lose in any such interaction. At the same time, Pakistan may just about be seen to be emerging from its strategic bind to the notion of ‘strategic assets’; the economy having seen its lowest ebb has only one way to go; and, regionally, Pakistan’s role as the guarantor of peace and security may have gained an inalienable recognition, almost granting it a prime position of responsibility to forge a regional solution to the difficult Afghanistan equation. Such positivity renders an improving Pakistan position of relative strength, auguring just the right moment to re-engage with India.

It is also a matter of the individual players who have at various times influenced how the relations between Pakistan and India shape up. A change of the National Security Advisor in the Indian establishment portends well for the region. Shiv Shankar Menon, the former foreign secretary, has replaced Narayanan in that position and that should help greatly. Menon is known as a proactive, engaging and thinking diplomat, who believes in the value of negotiation and engagement. He was the key to urging Manmohan Singh to sign the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement; just that the duo could not defend the stance back home and had to rescind under pressure.

Sharm el-Sheikh was actually a smart move by India, and Menon was able to extricate terrorism as a separate issue from the larger intractable gamut of the remaining dialogue. In another sub-clause of the same agreement, talks on terrorism were to go on unimpeded even if progress on other issues was seen to be negligible. The Pakistani side played victors by default when the Indians wrongly assumed the agreement a shameful submission, thereby saving the day for the Pakistani duo, who had walked into the Indian trap, hook line and sinker. The mere mention of the Balochistan problem with India was Pakistan’s picking from the engagement, though it must still find effect in some shape or form. Pakistan should have returned the terrorism favour back to India on Balochistan but has not yet been able to seal the case.

Chidambaram, the home minister, makes up sufficiently for Narayanan’s absence, and famously declared on the eve of talks that though he knew no progress was possible, it was to give a chance to those “who have hopes [of such talks]”.

The Pakistani strategy too has become evident in the light of how the talks progressed. Not that it should have been under any illusion expecting India to say and behave in any other way than what they did; it nonetheless had the scenario well considered. If, by a stroke of luck, India would show a more progressive approach, Pakistan must go along; if however the Indian obduracy became apparent, the opportunity of media engagement must be used to enunciate the entire ambit of Pakistani concerns. This was well articulated as a strategy. Though in the final analysis, it all amounted to a zero-sum game and another grand strategic failure, frittering away the opportunity to break from the bind that has held the region back while the rest of the world plods merrily along.

In the case of India and Pakistan, it is impossible to predict, much less shape, events. Their relationship has almost, without fail, been led by events beyond the pale of the regular politico-bureaucratic leadership. This smacks of a grand leadership failure. Can the near-term promise anything better? One doubts it very much. Regardless of the grandstanding, playing to the gallery and populist diplomacy, both sides need to smarten up from their ineptitude. One notices an effort at damage control past the event, literally the morning after, to avoid the event being termed as a grand diplomatic failure. Perhaps, the solution is for both India and Pakistan to let be, till events take shape or a statesman, any statesman, takes the helm. Till then, they will do well to avoid an armed conflict and a major catastrophe.

Shahzad Chaudhry is a retired air vice marshal and a former ambassador