By Peter J Brown

The three days Barack Obama will spend in Indonesia no doubt constitute a nostalgic high-point of a trip that will also take in Guam and Australia. Yet the return to a boyhood city is also replete with significant geopolitical and economic challenges.

The Obama administration has gone to great pains from its start over a year ago to make it clear that it intends to be fully engaged in Southeast Asia.

It will be crucial for Obama to acknowledge Indonesia’s key role in the region, “amidst China’s growing assertiveness and influence” during this visit, according to Evan Laksmana, a researcher at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta. Obama will visit Jakarta and Bali from March 23-25 before departing for Canberra.

Other objectives includes “fully normalizing and expandingrelations with Indonesia by addressing thorny issues like the lifting of the ban on interaction with the Indonesian Army Special Forces, and further reaching out to the Muslim world and improving America’s global standing by mending broken fences left in the wake of president [George W] Bush’s policies,” Laksmana said.

The ban Laksmana mentions involves a unit known as the Komando Pasukan Khusus, or Kopassus, and has been in place since the late 1990s. A high-ranking delegation of senior Indonesian military officers recently traveled to Washington for discussions on this situation.

Kopassus is not to be confused with “Detachment 88”, which is an elite Indonesian counter-terrorism squad named after the 88 Australians killed in the Bali bombing attacks in 2002. This unit has received funds, training and equipment from the US since its creation seven years ago. [1]

This month, Yohanes Sulaiman, a lecturer at the Indonesian Defense University and the executive director of the Center for Democracy Integrated Peace and Security Studies, wrote in The Jakarta Post, “The US needs a friendly Indonesia to maintain the stability of the region in the face of threats from a rising China and radical religious terrorists, not to mention criminal elements such as human traffickers or drug smugglers.”

“It is only fair the US help Indonesia modernize and equip itsmilitary forces,” Sulaiman said. “While the US Congress, especially the Democrats, are usually pretty hostile and critical toward the Indonesian military, Obama actually could persuade his Democrat party colleagues and more friendly Republican congressmen to back more military aid to Indonesia in order to improve regional security and stability.” [2]

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration needs aforeign policy triumph “amidst plummeting public approval and domestic political crises”, according to Laksmana.

“Finally removing the last ‘pebble in the shoe’ in US-Indonesiamilitary-to-military relations, ie the special forces ban, and even possibly providing new military hardware, would certainly endear the president in the eyes of the Indonesian military whose support is desperately needed by the embattled president,” Laksmana said. “Finally, American investment and education initiatives, if expanded, certainly won’t hurt as well.”

In effect, this trip may require more careful navigating by Obama than has been previously acknowledged.

“[This ban] is still held up by congressional restrictions on certain types of aid because of the past human-rights abuses of Kopassus,” said Josh Kurlantzick, a fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City. “It is unclear whether congress will move on this.”

Domestic politics are causing considerable turmoil in Indonesia. Yudhoyono faces criticism from all sides as he tries to press ahead with a reformist agenda to liberalize trade and finance laws. He struggles with endemic corruption and his attempt to develop a more independent court system is a difficult task at best.

“Against him is Indonesia’s populist tradition that is suspicious of the West and decisions they feel benefit the wealthy,” said Abraham Denmark, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, DC. “These forces may use Obama’s visit as an opportunity to embarrass Yudhoyono and highlight their discontent. Obama will have to be careful to ensure that his proposals are carefully calibrated for Indonesia’s complex domestic political environment.”

The complexity of the situation is enormous. Laksmana identifies a number of sensitive issues that “Obama needs to look out for”, including “the role of Islam in the state, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, corruption and good governance, terrorism and security, as well as the normalization of mil-to-mil [military-to-military] relations.”

“There are tricky issues that Obama would do well to speak about carefully,” said Laksmana.

Among other things, Indonesia was the first Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) country to candidly express its reservations about the way in which the new China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) might adversely impact the Indonesian economy. CAFTA may or may not come up and how Obama responds will be watched closely.

Kurlantzick doubts that Obama is going to spend any time on this trip talking about CAFTA with Indonesians. “It is a trade deal he is not party to, and there are many other important US-Indonesian bilateral issues to discuss,” said Kurlantzick.

Denmark, on the other hand, describes Obama as an advocate for free trade and thus inclined to support CAFTA. “[Obama should] highlight the benefits it can bring to the regular people ofIndonesia. A clear and convincing defense of free trade may help Yudhoyono and his reformist agenda,” said Denmark.

What concerns Laksmana is the possibility that the debate over CAFTA might somehow be misconstrued as a manifestation of broad-based “anti-Chinese” sentiment.

Indonesia’s stand on CAFTA is not in any way an indication of a willingness on the part of Indonesians to start waving an “anti-Chinese” banner, Laksmana said. ”The rejection was, despite some fringe voices, mainly economic. Unemployment and Chinese products dominating the local market are critical in this regard. So again, the rejection is not an anti-Chinese move per se.”

Laksmana also cautions that if Obama says the wrong thing about CAFTA he might suddenly provide the opposition with an opportunity to embarrass him and cast the whole trip in a negative light.

“Obama should avoid discussing [CAFTA] or [commenting about] how Indonesia should deal with China or how Jakarta should have better prepared the Indonesia public for [CAFTA],” said Laksmana. “This can be easily spun by opposition leaders as meddling in Indonesia’s internal affairs.”

That said, Laksmana doubts that during such a public and symbolic visit China would be a focal point of discussion between Obama and Yudhoyono. “There are enough problems to sort out between the countries anyway. In regards to ASEAN, meanwhile, Obama would probably do well to continue repeating his support for a future regional architecture where ASEAN would play a critical role,” said Laksmana.

Still, while China’s rise will certainly hover in the background for this visit, “The US is engaging Indonesia and Southeast Asia more broadly because of its own importance,” said Denmark.

“In terms of potential dark clouds, Obama’s discussion of the importance of Indonesia should be carefully calibrated to not offend the sensibilities of Indonesia’s neighbors, many of whom are also friends of the US,” said Denmark. “As the US looks to build a closer relationship with Indonesia, officials from other states in the region have privately expressed to me a twinge of concern that the US would be able to improve its relations withJakarta without implicitly downgrading America’s relationships with its other friends in the region, or ASEAN overall.”

All the countries in the region, including Indonesia, “are trying to figure out how to balance the US and China, but China is far enough away from Indonesia that it is less of an issue for Jakarta than it would be for, say, Bangkok,” Kurlantzick said.

“Indonesia definitely has competitiveness issues vis-a-vis China but the strategic concerns are much less, so any idea that the US could push Indonesia to play a kind of anti-China strategic role is pretty unlikely.”

China’s shadow may loom large, but Obama will most likely also have India in mind. India will certainly be a keen observer as Obama visits what is, in effect, India’s extended neighborhood.

“In many ways Indonesia is a smaller version of India – a pluralist, multiethnic, multilingual society that also jealously guards its sovereignty and strategic autonomy,” said Sourabh Gupta, senior research associate at Samuels International Associates in Washington, DC. “An expression of US support for Indonesia’s rise in Asia as well as within global forums such as the G-20 [Group of 20] would be a reassuring signal of the US’s interest in cultivating robust democratic societies in Asia that are proud and independent-minded.”

This all about laying the groundwork for a new strategic partnership involving non-treaty allies of the US in Asia, while demonstrating an understanding of where exactly India fits in.

“Indian foreign policy managers have explicitly detailed the entire Indian Ocean rim stretching from Southeast Asia to Southern Africa as its ‘extended neighborhood’. Indonesia is arguably the most important country – after the US presence – within this extended neighborhood as well as a valued geographic neighbor by way of a shared maritime boundary,” said Gupta.

India already has a bilateral agreement with Jakarta and Bangkok for joint coordinated patrols by the three navies in the Bay of Bengal at the mouth of the Malacca Strait.

“US expression of support for enhanced capacity building, technical assistance and information-sharing with the Indonesian navy as well as coordinated, quadrilateral, sub-regional patrols by the four navies would be seen appreciatively in New Delhi,” said Gupta.

Gupta labels this arrangement as “functionally more useful than that other grander ‘quad’ initiative” involving the US, India, Japan and Australia “which was seen to be lighter content-wise, appeared to be a close-ended arrangement excluding Indonesia and ASEAN, and was deemed to be more polarizing in its anti-China containment connotations”.

In the context of ongoing US efforts to reach out to the Muslim community as a whole, expectations are probably enormous. Besides re-emphasizing the importance of Indonesia and Southeast Asia to American interests, and promoting Indonesia’s long-term development and emergence as a pivotal state, Denmark identifies highlighting “the success of a democratic, pluralistic state with a majority Muslim population” as Obama’s third major objective in Jakarta.

Indonesia’s top two Islamic groups – Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah – are urging Indonesian Muslims to welcome Obama.

“The Prophet [Mohammad] himself also had diplomatic ties with adherents of other faiths,” said Hasyim Muzadi, the head of NU, while describing Obama as someone who “had shown good intentions in efforts to improve ties between the US and the Islamic world”.

However, the welcome mat is not being extended by at least one conservative Islamic organization, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, after spokesman Muhamad Ismail Yusanto tied Obama’s trip to the presence of US energy companies and stated, “The fact that Obama lived here as a child did not warrant special treatment.” [3]
Denmark emphasizes that Indonesia is not a Muslim country, but a pluralistic democratic country that has a majority Muslim population. “That being said, Obama’s outreach to the Muslim world, first in Egypt, then Turkey, and now Indonesia, is an important theme of his young presidency,” said Denmark.

When it comes to ongoing US efforts to reach out to the Muslim world, Laksmana recommended that Obama speak directly to the people he is reaching out to. “Obama should stage town hall meetings and invite the ‘fundamentalist’ groups to engage in a public and frank discussion,” said Laksmana. “This of course could risk giving credence to such fringe groups. Therefore, a safer bet would be for Obama to organize a public discussion involving the major Islamic organizations like NU or Muhammadiyah.”

“Obama is probably going to cite Indonesia as an example of ‘Muslim democracy’ but many Indonesians do not really like to be viewed that way,” said Kurlantzick.

According to Denmark, while Indonesia seeks to solidify its relationship with the last of the “big four” (China, India, Australia, the US – all of whom have affirmed a strategic partnership with Indonesia), this will also enable Jakarta to “highlight Indonesia’s regional significance, promote reform and liberalization domestically”.

“This is a long-term process that will likely cover several American administrations. Right now, Indonesia’s domestic politics will prevent it from being the active and engaged partner that it may be in the future,” said Denmark. “For now, the US should encourage Indonesia’s democracy and liberalization, promote its emergence as a regional power with global influence, and help it carve a realistic niche for itself within the international system.”

Notes
1. Martyrdom, Interrupted National Interest Online, March 3, 2010.
2. What we could expect from Obama’s visit.
3. Obama is Welcome in Indonesia, Say Leading Muslim GroupsJakarta Globe, March 16, 2010.

Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from Maine USA