A minefield of contradictions —Sikander Amani

The IEDs have become an important element in the mythologisation of the insurgency and the counter-insurgency, as in the creation of prototypical images of the enemy and of the hero on which all conflicts rely

Among the unsavoury new words popularised by the recent wars, we may count the now ubiquitous acronym IED, standing for Improvised Explosive Device — basically, a roadside bomb, which explodes either by contact or through remote control. The IEDs have become the nightmare of the US and allied troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan: in Iraq, because although the number of the IEDs has plummeted (from a peak of 23,000 IED attacks in 2007 to 3,000 in 2009, according to US military figures), their efficiency has grown fantastically, while in Afghanistan, if the IEDs remain relatively low-tech, using fertilisers or diesel fuel, their number has soared. The US military recorded close to 8,200 IED events in 2009, compared to a little below 2,700 in 2007. Not that they are inefficient; each IED attack causes, on average, 50 percent more casualties than it did three years ago. Enormous amounts of energy and money are spent to try to defeat the IEDs. The US military set up the JIEDDO (Joint IED Defeat Organisation), with a budget of $ 4 billion in 2008, part of a $ 17 billion budget specific to IED research and training programmes, not including money allocated for armoured vehicles and other equipment to protect troops. Since one of the main problems of the IEDs is their invisibility and difficulty to be detected, as an increasing number of them are devoid of metal parts, many of these research projects centre around detection engines — the NIRF (Neutralising Improvised Explosive Devices with Radio Frequency), the PING (a Pentagon microwave project), the LIBS sensor (Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy System), the PackBot robot, and, latest in line, the Yellow Jacket, an unmanned detection helicopter. The IEDs may have spurred research and engineering, but they have also proved a bonus for American acronymic and linguistic creativity.

Dozens, or rather hundreds, of research papers from the most serious sources are now devoted to the IEDs, both in their technicalities and as symptoms of the new nature of the wars being fought: asymmetrical wars, where super duper armoured Ninja high-tech soldiers are opposed to ragtag, sandal-wearing, invisible, low-tech, rural, fertiliser-using combatants. The IEDs have been instrumental in the 2007 shift in US tactics, from a conventional war approach to counter-insurgency. They have also been instrumental in diabolising the enemy — the snide, deceitful, treacherous foe who never appears face-to-face for a valorous duel, but sneaks away after having posed his bomb. The IEDs have thus become an important element in the mythologisation of the insurgency and the counter-insurgency, as in the creation of prototypical images of the enemy and of the hero on which all conflicts rely, those in Iraq and in Afghanistan no less than any other. The perfect hero is now the IED defuser, while the perfect villain is the IED-maker. Truth be said, it is difficult to imagine being perfectly comfortable and cosy around an IED-maker, as you never know what trick he might pull out of his sleeve.

But it is no less puzzling to see such virtuous indignation from US lawmakers and strategists. The IEDs are nothing more than the poor man’s version of landmines, which the US has abundantly used in the past, and still claim the right to use. The US is one of the few countries not party to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), which 80 percent of the world’s states have signed and ratified. Under the MBT, states commit, among others, to never use antipersonnel mines, nor to “develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer” them, and to destroy mines in their stockpiles within four years of the treaty becoming binding. The MBT was opened for signature in 1997, and officially entered into force in 1999. The Clinton administration decided, in a typically Clintonesque waltz, not to accede to the MBT, but stated that the US would sign it by 2006. Wishful thinking! In 2004, the inimitable Bush announced that the US had no intention of signing the MBT, and that it would continue to use “persistent (i.e. always-armed, and live) landmines” until at least 2010. Obama ‘The Saint’ said he would review US policy in the matter, only to announce in November 2009 that actually, no, US “defence interests” demanded that the US not ratify the MBT. We are back to square one.

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) has convincingly shown, though, that the vast majority — between 70 and 85 percent — of landmine victims are civilians, that landmines hamper economic growth, that they have massive long-term effects on the population, that they fail any “just war” test and that they do not offer any military advantage. In strict military terms then, antipersonnel mines are not particularly useful, and even injure or kill soldiers, i.e. the very people they are meant to protect. For example, in the 1991 Gulf War, a third of US casualties were caused by their own landmines, which must feel rather dumb.

The issue is not just that of hypocrisy and the use of double standards on the part of the US (though that too is getting slightly irritating): our landmines are a defence need, they are a “unique military tool, which cannot be replaced by other available technologies”, and they are good because we are the good guys, so there is no reason for us to sign the MBT; your IEDs are bad and wrong, because, hmm, you are the bad guys. But one is also led to wonder about their ongoing schizophrenia. On the one hand, here you have some department within the Pentagon spending billions on trying to detect and stop the use of these infernal IEDs, while another, just down the corridor, spends billions inventing and developing its own IEDs — the non-persistent, i.e. self-deactivating, landmines. Imagine the fun conversations these guys must all have during lunch-break.

The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at sikander.amani@gmail.com