The recovery of jihadi paraphernalia from a Karachi mosque is a sobering reminder that militant outfits are quietly carrying on their business in Pakistan.

Copies of computerised national ID cards and alien registration cards belonging to Afghan nationals and local supporters of the Jaish-i-Muhammad were also confiscated by law-enforcement officials from the mosque. The material seized in the raid, carried out in the wake of the failed Times Square bomb plot, included speeches of Jaish leader Masood Azhar, the banned outfit’s literature as well as donation receipts. The mosque was also maintaining data on Jaish cadres. This compels us to ask why the government takes action against jihadi groups only when there is pressure from abroad?

Though actual training camps for militants are active largely in the tribal northwest, it is the nation’s urban centres that serve as potential recruiting grounds for the jihadis. Hate literature is not as easily available as it once was in Karachi but it can be obtained by those who want it — perhaps through certain mosques, as underscored by the latest episode — which act as fronts for militant outfits. In Peshawar, too, hate literature is no longer commonly available; yet those who know the ‘right’ people can get hold of it. But perhaps the situation is most alarming in Lahore where militant outfits are known to openly sell their material through mosques and madressahs. If this information is common knowledge, it is hard to believe that the country’s intelligence apparatus is unaware of the jihadis’ activities.

Sadly, our security establishment only acts when Pakistani or Pakistan-based militants attack or threaten to attack others and we, in turn, are threatened with “severe consequences”. These groups pose a danger to Pakistan more than to anyone else. When cornered they have no qualms about turning their guns on the state and its citizens. Created in the Zia era and nurtured by elements in the intelligence agencies, the jihadi infrastructure has spiralled out of control, and action is necessary before matters become even worse.

The state must neutralise the plethora of militant outfits that earn opprobrium for Pakistan internationally and weaken it internally. The networks that help spread hate and promote jihad must be decisively dismantled. Militant leaders and hardened terrorists must be brought to justice, while less lethal supporters must be urged to renounce violence and reintegrated in society. Meanwhile the ulema — whose role has been largely disappointing — should be seen to clearly dissociate themselves from the terrorists. Their contribution is vital, for the opinion of the common man is moulded to a large extent by their religious philosophy.