Oriel College is tucked away in the medieval heart of Oxford, and has a lovely square and hall. Established by Charles II in 1326, it has continued to provide generations of students with a fine education. In another incarnation, I would love to study there. Invited to speak to members of the Pakistan Society at Oxford, I was shown around the ancient premises by Ayyaz Mallick, the highly articulate young office-bearer of the Society who had arranged my visit.

I had decided to speak about Muslim attitudes towards the West, and inevitably, the discussion during the question and answer session veered towards Afghanistan and the Taliban threat Pakistan faces. Most of the questions and comments were well informed, and reflected on the high level of concern so many Pakistanis feel about the situation.

While I made it clear that I (and nobody else, to my knowledge) had any easy answers to the threat of Islamic militancy and terrorism faced by Pakistan and the entire region, it was a danger that needed to be faced collectively and resolutely.

When asked about the attempts by the Western coalition to engage the Taliban in talks, and why it would be wrong for us to do so, I pointed out that coalition forces were trying to negotiate a withdrawal from the region.

We, on the other hand, would have to deal with these stone-age warriors because we lived in the neighbourhood. I reminded the students of the excesses committed by the Taliban against their own people — and especially the women — when they were in power.

I have long argued that when we talk about the Taliban and the possibility of their return to power, we are not discussing some theoretical model: the horrors they inflicted on the Afghan people is a mater of recent record, not some remote theological abstraction.

It is certainly true, as I argued in my talk, that the Western presence has complicated matters. The Karzai government is a disaster that has alienated many Afghans.

Nevertheless, if the coalition forces withdraw tomorrow, it would create a crisis for Pakistan and the entire region. When asked why we should not negotiate with the Pakistani extremists as the Americans were trying to with the Afghan Taliban, I pointed out the many occasions when our army had tried to do just that, only to be double-crossed.

The reality is that these extremists use negotiations as a ploy to gain time while they re-arm and redeploy, and then break their agreements when it suits them. This has happened time and again, most notably in Swat.

When fighting a foe who wants nothing less than to impose his version of the Sharia on the entire country at gunpoint, negotiations are impossible.

However, the war is not going terribly well on both sides of the border. As the Taliban say, the West might have the clocks, but they have the time. Already, battle fatigue is setting in among voters and taxpayers.

Eight years after Western forces toppled the Taliban, the war has now lasted longer than the Second World War. Had the planners of the operation any idea of how long the conflict would last, I am sure they would have paused for reflection. But now the die is cast, and we need to focus on how to end the fighting.

Continuing this discussion with my host at his farm close to Oxford the next day, I was given a glimpse of what might be possible, at least in Afghanistan. My friend is an agricultural expert who has served as a consultant for a number of international organizations around the world.

His journeys have taken him to Afghanistan a number of times, and he is appalled that more attention is not being paid to building up trade channels and commercial institutions that would give Afghans a bigger stake in their own country.

One example he gave was very illuminating. Near Jalalabad, farmers were provided with seeds for fodder, and then given advice on how to raise cows. After the local market was saturated, they were provided with a chilled tanker to transport their milk to Kabul where it was a huge success.

Last November, the Taliban hijacked the tanker and kidnapped the driver. Outraged, the farmers picked up their arms, and marched towards the local Taliban hideout where they demanded the immediate release of the driver and the tanker. The Taliban, unwilling to take on this angry mob, gave in.

The point here is that when poor people finally make some money, they will fight to protect their means of livelihood. But when they are asked to choose between a crooked Karzai government and the brutal regime of the Taliban, all they want to do is duck for cover.

Instead of focusing on ways to assist locals acquire the means of helping themselves, my friend said that most aid agencies seldom understand the dynamics of the marketplace, or how Afghans think.

As an example, he cited a British project in Helmand where DfID (Department for International Development) was providing wheat seeds to a remote region of the province. My friend was asked to evaluate the project, and when he arrived there, he discovered to his horror that no agricultural expert had been asked for advice while setting up the programme.

He was also appalled to see that instead of using normal Afghan distribution channels, DfID had entrusted the task of getting the seeds to farmers to the British army.

Apart from risking the lives of soldiers, this also bypassed small Afghan traders, thereby alienating them from the whole process. My friend’s point was that by associating locals and giving them a stake, you strengthen such aid programmes.

And this is only the tip of the iceberg. Billions have been wasted as well-meaning but clueless Westerners have charged in and squandered large amounts of money to no effect.

In many cases, a significant proportion of this cash has ended up in Taliban pockets. Instead of seeking advice from experienced and well-informed experts like my friend, aid agencies like DfID have relied on fresh graduates to design and implement multi-million aid programmes that have produced little to show for the money pumped in.

Far from oversight and media scrutiny, these pen-pushers often end up doing more harm than good. Clearly, this battle for hearts and minds is not going too well.

dawn.com