Established at first as an institution of higher studies, a madressah (Arabic plural “madaris”) initially taught law, Islamic sciences and philosophy. During the 11th and 12th centuries, madaris specialised in law and jurisprudence. Today’s madressah is an Islamic religious school (seminary) where students, as young as nine or ten, at times even younger, learn religious education, schooled first of all in reading and then in religious studies. Initially a part of a mosque, madaris only later became separate institutions. With the introduction of Western education under colonial rule their curriculum underwent a change.

A madressah is not a Quranic school, or maktab, a place where Muslim children only read and recite the Quran at a very elementary level. Madaris offer a more organised institutional structure and different academic levels of religious studies. Most Pakistani madaris are affiliated with one of the five Islamic school boards, or Wafaq: three Sunni Madressah Boards (Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahl-e-Hadith), one for the Jamaat-e-Islami and one for Shias. This entire system, mostly belonging to the Sunni sect because Pakistan is predominantly Sunni, is supported largely by the private sector and communities through trusts, endowments, donations and zakat (religious tithes) contributions.

A madressah is mostly registered with the government as a charitable corporate body with acquired tax exemption. Among the Sunnis, the majority are Barelvi, a moderate group who seek to be inclusive of local rituals and customs, the seminaries run by the Jamaat-e-Islami are non-sectarian but politically very active. In the context of extremism, the remaining two streams of madaris are considered most important. The Deobandi school of thought (originating in the Indian town of Deoband, near Delhi), have long sought to purify Islam by rejecting “un-Islamic” accretions to the faith and returning to the models established in the Holy Quran. The Ahle-Hadith (followers of the way of the Prophet) have a similar emphasis on “purifying” the faith, but follow the Salafi fiqh (religious jurisprudence), as opposed to the Hanafi fiqh used by the Deobandis.

No comprehensive and/or credible census of madaris exists in Pakistan. A 2004 Congressional Research Service report, “Terrorism in South Asia,” puts the number at 10,000-20,000, the seminaries extending along the borders of Afghanistan, from Karachi to Balochistan and continuing into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). In April 2002 Pakistan’s ministry of religious affairs estimated the number of madaris to be approximately 10,000, with 1.7 million students (including about 448 women-only madaris). The figure is probably closer to 12,000 with about two million students, by conservative estimates.

Seminaries mushroomed during the regime of military ruler Ziaul Haq. His Islamisation policies were meant mainly to establish his own legitimacy. Other factors include the Iranian revolution, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan and the subsequent Afghan “jihad” against Soviet troops, and Pakistan’s involvement in the Afghan war. Students in these madaris also come from other countries, especially Afghanistan.

For the poor, a madressah offers free boarding and food for their children, an opportunity to gain literacy and employment, an irresistible option of hope when compared to the bleak future availing from crumbling or non-existent government-funded secular schools. Successive Pakistani governments have tacitly encouraged this to avoid spending much on education. Only 7,000 Pakistani children attended madaris 30 years ago, compared to the two million today. Functioning as shelters and orphanages for many young children, runaways and refugees where the state apparatus is lacking, madaris have come forward as a parallel system of education that is more viable for the impoverished.

Stretching from Jhang to Bahawalpur, southern Punjab is an educational battleground, dotted with the most aggressive and militant of all madaris, dominated by feudal lords with large landholdings. The cities and towns of this region are teeming with the poor masses, both controlled by jihadi groups. Private citizens from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait, thinking they are spreading the message of Islam through petrodollars, fund them generously.

This led to a sustained spurt in Deobandi madaris, not only in the Pakhtun areas of Pakistan near the Afghan border but also in Karachi, as well as inrural Punjab. This money also encouraged a Wahhabi jihad-centred curriculum. Almost the entire Taliban leadership are graduates from the Haqqania, including Mullah Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, while the Binori madressah, whose leader Mufti Shamzai was assassinated, was once suspected to be a possible hiding place of Osama bin Laden. Reportedly this is where bin Laden met Mullah Omar to form the Al-Qaeda-Taliban partnership.

A March 2009 report found that about 18 per cent of the madaris were affiliated with sectarian outfits such as Sipah-e-Sahaba, Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Islamist texts advocating violent jihad against other religious sects form part of the curricula in some madaris. Militant pamphlets or magazines circulate in certain madaris, especially those openly aligned with a particular militant group. Research about the connection between Pakistani madaris and Islamic extremism finds a disturbing relationship between religious seminaries and sectarian violence. However, contrary to perceptions, a vast majority of madaris, almost 80 per cent, do not subscribe to this virulent hate. While they may be far from rendering adequate education, it is wrong to condemn them outright as all supporting jihadis.

After the September 11 attacks, madaris were widely associated with violence, even though all the 9/11 perpetrators were university educated, some in the US, and with no connection to any madressah. Pakistan was quickly assumed as being a culprit because Osama bin Laden was believed to be hiding in the maintains straddling the Durand Line.

The US government put severe pressure on the Pervez Musharraf government. In 2002 he made key pledges regarding madressah reforms. The government promised: (1) the registration of all madaris to know which groups were running which religious schools; (2) regulation of the curriculum so that all madaris would adopt a common government curriculum by the end of 2002; (3) adoption of measures to stop the use of madaris and mosques as centres for the spread of political and religious inflammatory statements and publications; and (4) establishment of model madaris providing useful modern education.

Despite all the good talk, none of Musharraf’s 2002 promises to reform madaris have been fulfilled, or even come close to it. Only three model madaris have been set up – one each in Karachi, Sukkur and Islamabad, with a total of 300 students. Compared to the estimated two million students in the more than 12,000 madaris in Pakistan this number is ridiculous. The curriculum of these model madrassas includes English, mathematics, computer science, economics, political science, law and Pakistan studies. These institutions were not welcomed by the ulema (religious scholars), because no real effort was made to involve them. Only a very small minority has supported the government in the modernisation of religious institutions.

There is a dire need for the fulfilment of the promises made by the Musharraf regime in 2002. More important is the need to implement alternatives to the madressah, to reduce the dependence of the poor and impoverished on it.

(This is the first of two articles on the madressah system and a viable alternative to madaris.)

The writer is a defence and political analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com