The recent violence in southern Kyrgyzstan, which left 2,000 people dead and led to the displacement of over 100,000 others, entailed clashes between the region’s two main ethnic groups, the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.
But the dust has barely settled on the ruined cities of Osh and Jalalabad, and already allegations are surfacing that a ‘third force’ — Islamic extremist organisations and militant groups — spurred the violence.
The question of whether militants were involved in the Kyrgyzstan unrest should be of interest to Pakistan for various reasons. It could indicate whether recent military operations in the tribal belt have successfully driven out foreign militants from the region. More importantly, if it is found that militants were not active in the attacks against ethnic Uzbeks, our government might borrow a tip or two on staving off extremism from their counterparts in Bishkek.
Earlier this week, the head of Kyrgyzstan’s State Security Service claimed that relatives of recently ousted president Kurmanbek Bakiyev conspired with Islamic militants to stir trouble in the country’s south. He warned that the former president’s son and brother had been in meetings with commanders of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) as well as the Afghan Taliban and Tajik militants.
Without implicating the Bakiyevs, a UN special envoy to the region also cautioned of an extremist threat brewing in Central Asia, particularly in the over-populated, multi-ethnic Ferghana valley that stretches across Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Moscow also aired fears that Kyrgyzstan’s south could transform into a safe haven for transnational militants.
It would hardly come as a surprise to learn that extremists are active in Kyrgyzstan as all the factors that breed militancy are present. The country’s south offers a major drug trafficking route out of Afghanistan and is rife with poverty, illiteracy, ethnic tensions and frustrated youth. Kyrgyzstan is also a frontline state in the ‘Great Game’ between Russia and the US: it operates under Moscow’s political shadow even while hosting the American Manas airbase, which supplies US troops fighting in Afghanistan. Further, the Central Asian state borders China’s restive Xinjiang province, where Muslim Uighurs have recently pushed up against Beijing’s restrictive take on language and religion.
As such, Kyrgyzstan’s geopolitical conundrum is poised to inspire much heady militant rhetoric. The extremist group Hizbut Tahrir (HT) — which aims to establish an Islamic caliphate and enjoys some social support in the country — has championed Muslim rule as a way to free Kyrgyzstan from the “hegemony of regional and global powers”. In other parts of the Muslim world, such campaigns have proved effective in recruiting disenfranchised youth to the extremist cause.
The country also has a history of militant activity. In 2005, extremists were found to be behind a rebellion in the Ferghana valley. And for the past two years, defence analysts have pointed out that IMU militants who had relocated to the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been returning to their homes.
Despite this extremism-conducive cocktail, analysts, international monitors and journalists remain sceptical of the government’s claims that militants were involved in the recent ethnic violence. An ongoing inquiry has not pointed fingers at such groups, and no group has claimed responsibility for the violence. There are greater concerns that the security forces of the interim government sided with ethnic Kyrgyz in attacks against the southern Uzbeks. Security analysts warn that invocations of militancy are a political ploy to distract attention from this fact and permanently discredit Bakiyev.
If it is shown that there was no militant involvement in the unrest, Kyrgyzstan’s crackdown against such groups in recent years will have proven to be effective, and could offer guidelines for other states facing a similar threat.
In 2005, the country’s Supreme Court issued a ban on radical Islamic groups, including the HT, IMU, the East Turkestan Liberation Organisation, and the East Turkestan Islamic Party (the latter two act on behalf of China’s Uighurs). At the time, critics of the ban asserted that it was a savvy geopolitical move, aimed at pleasing the US, Russia and China, rather than a genuine security measure. Either way, the ban curtailed the groups’ activities and drove members abroad.
The Kyrgyz authorities have also favoured long prison terms for those found guilty of extremist activity. While in the first half of this decade members of groups such as HT were handed down sentences of one to three years’ imprisonment, recent sentences have averaged between five and seven years. In 2008, a Kyrgyz court sentenced Islamists to 20 years in jail for demonstrating in the country’s south. Although there are now concerns that militant networks are being established behind bars, strong punitive measures have minimised militant recruitment.
In January 2009, the former president Bakiyev also signed a controversial law aimed at neutralising Islamic movements. It banned proselytising, private religious education, and the import and dissemination of religious literature; prevented children from joining religious organisations; and made it more difficult to register religious groups. Human rights groups rejected the law, saying that it violated the freedom to religious expression.
No doubt, Bakiyev should have amended certain sections of the law to bring them in line with international standards of religious freedom. But his non-military, multifaceted approach to tackling militancy holds a lesson for countries like Pakistan that are taking too narrow an approach in their fight against extremism.
Other factors have also played a role in keeping militancy at bay in Kyrgyzstan. For instance, many IMU fighters have been distracted by activities in Afghanistan. That they were not involved in the recent violence indicates that they are settled in safe havens in North Waziristan. It also helps that the HT and IMU have disparate agendas, which has prevented a unified extremist movement from taking hold (though the Pakistani example has shown how easily joint militant momentum can be gained).
In the wake of ethnic unrest, Kyrgyzstan’s interim government is seeking to establish legitimacy and introduce constitutional changes to strengthen the parliament. Islamabad should keep an eye on developments in the country — its battle with militancy is a mirror of our own troubles.
Mohammed Abbasi 