COMMENT: Indo-Pak dialogue: undertones and ramifications —Shahzad Chaudhry

Pakistan must stay the course against terrorism and its deadly manifestations along its own timeline as per the dictates of its own priority list

McChrystal’s sacking was dramatic and carried that underlying sensitivity to the Pakistani sentiment of seeing civilian superiority assert itself over the military — something the Pakistani political system has not yet been able to establish with any assurance. It was an operationally wrong move to sack McChrystal. While principle trumped operational sense — this may be the only redemption for the US political cause — US policy will most certainly go into hibernation and, as time is lost significantly, reduce its options. As the demoted and tired Petraeus takes on yet another operational responsibility, kicked down from his rather hallowed position of Commander CENTCOM, he will need time to reorient himself to the field, re-energise to put his fighting boots back on and reconnect to the sweaty, dirty world of war — fighting a morally resurgent Taliban. A weakened Petraeus with suspect political support from his own authorities will have circumscribed ambitions and a more realistic approach to seek an honourable exit; he will need Pakistan even more to help reconcile and reintegrate Afghan groups within the available time.

Change the scene to Indo-Pak parleys as late as the last week and those that are impending, of the two foreign ministers in July, and one can sense the apprehensions and foreboding that these two regional neighbours of Afghanistan are undergoing to wrest with the fall-out of a US withdrawal. It is propitious that the two have begun talking to each other. Indian interests in their dialogue with Pakistan are wider. These are essentially three: terrorism as an opening gambit and something to keep Pakistan under pressure with, Afghanistan and India’s desperation to get a foot in on a more than likely closed door and a possibility to seek an expanded trading area covering the region and extending up to Central Asia.

Sidelined at the London Conference and increasingly discounted in the emerging Afghan situation, it is to recover their lost position on the table that India seeks to engage Pakistan. With a more amenable Pakistan willing to let the Indian foot in, in turn for a promising bilateral engagement that will deliver peace in the wake of, perhaps, the most challenging time since the break-up of the country in 1971, the chances for India in Afghanistan look better. That such Indian flexibility in post-conflict Afghanistan can augur well for India’s extended interests in Central Asia for trade and for energy, and for the larger South Asia and South-West Asian region of influence, especially when the Indian economy is past its critical mass, will be the real picking. This is where Pakistan has leverage — with India’s desperation and its real interest to keep a toehold in Afghanistan. Without Pakistan enabling transit trade through its territories from India to Afghanistan, the return remains minimal even if India can curry favour separately with Karzai. India’s Dilaram-Chabahar road option remains suspect and extremely cumbersome, exponentially increasing the cost of business. With a less than helpful Afghan government in place after US withdrawal, India’s hopes for a reasonable return may remain entirely stalled. Enter the need to break the logjam with Pakistan.

India’s second interest in the Pakistani dialogue is in its overstated but opportune concern for terrorism. India has found a handy cause to flog Pakistan with. Even if Hafiz Saeed and all those under trial for their alleged role in the Mumbai incident were to be incarcerated and punished, it may only serve to satisfy India’s bloated sense of self-importance, seeking manifest redemption of its wounded pride but in no way can it provide the assurance of immunity from further terrorist activities within India, whether home-grown or arising out of Pakistan. India’s refrain on terrorism is thus weak and reeks of a self-serving insidious agenda of Pakistan-bashing than a real concern to seek cooperative ways to recover from the malice that this menace has unleashed. India’s growing Naxal insurgency itself is a plate-full and may, at some time, need wider cooperation. Terrorism will continue to serve India’s cause till it gets nastier and needs a more serious Indian approach. Till then Pakistan will just need to find a way around Indian barbs. In the meanwhile, Pakistan must stay the course against terrorism and its deadly manifestations along its own timeline as per the dictates of its own priority list.

On trade, more informed heads need to gather. Nay-saying to an existing reality in denial is self-defeating. Trade and trading infrastructure — the means of communication, travel and transportation — are the fastest means to economic integration; economic integration increases interdependence and eliminates conflict much faster and more effectively than any superiority in weapons. It also helps create jobs, spreads well being and a sense of common stakes ensuring societal cohesion, integration and stability. Identity becomes possible, moorings remain intact and radicalism is defeated. With India, an additional benefit is the possibility of in-coming investments. We may determine what may be our sensitivity in a particular industry and not make that available for foreign investment, just as India has done in some cases, but we need to open up all the same. Otherwise trade, like water, has this habit of going around when an obstruction seems too stubborn. This too is part of India’s grand design and therefore a Pakistani leverage. It also is a Pakistani compulsion and must therefore find favour. For this to happen, we will need to dump archaic notions of security and access and instead redouble efforts to channel potential in the right directions.

Pakistan’s interest in dialogue with India are also three: peace for that will deliver Pakistan of this unending need to match India’s growing military prowess — tank for tank, plane for plane, making minimum credible deterrence, both conventional and nuclear, actually possible; Kashmir, which India will be happy to divert to the back channel as a preferred option since it finds useful promise in the Musharraf formula away from the stubborn sense of the UNSC resolution or a damaging possibility of a rebellious state of Kashmir seeking independence rather than autonomy, rendering the issue to a belaboured, slow process and, finally, water, which for some insane reason has trumped even Kashmir — to India’s glee. A distorted and ill-informed discourse on water in Pakistan has generated such hype and sensitivity that it beats the real magnitude of infringement by India. While the spirit may have been a minor casualty in an odd case, chances are that no neutral expert will be able to find the letter grossly violated. Hence India’s ready sense of offering all support and cooperation to Pakistan on the water issue; since nothing much is wrong, nothing much needs to be offered.

On the face of it, the need for an Indo-Pak dialogue seems like a pretty straightforward case of mutually beneficial adjustments, of using space intelligently and with imagination, trust, thought, dourness to prevail. And, we would have lost yet another opportunity to overcome history.

Shahzad Chaudhry is a retired air vice marshal