COMMENT: Religious authority and the nation state —Ahmad Ali Khalid

It seems in Pakistan the religious hierarchy is dominated by conservatives and more alarmingly radicals, hence the crucial question is, do these clerics represent the wider religiosity of the Pakistani public?

The nation state marks a paradigm shift for Muslim societies who have traditionally been ruled by sultanates, self-proclaimed caliphs and monarchs. The concept of the nation state, itself arguably born out of the experiences of the French and American Revolutions, which gave rise to the phenomenon of constitutionalism, codification of a positivist law and separation of powers, has presented unique challenges to Muslim societies.

Indeed the first shariah-based modern code of law, which set the pattern for all future codi?cations of the shariah, was not in the medieval age but in the age of modernity initiated by the Ottoman Empire in the 16 books of the Mecelle (subsumed under the Tanzimat Reforms) during the decade just preceding the drafting of the Ottoman Constitution, 1869-1876, which can be seen as an attempt to create an ‘Islamic constitutionalism’ in response to the perceived encroaching juridical-political hegemony of the Europeans.

One of these challenges has been in the sphere of religious authority. Religious authority can assume a number of functions, from establishing an orthodox normative to establishing a canon of authoritative texts and interpretations. But defining and constructing religious authority in a nation state presents unique challenges.

This question is even more pertinent given the recent changes made to the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) and the appointment of a new head, which some say is unrepresentative of the religiosity of the general public and regressive. Senator Sherani, the new appointed head, belongs to the Jamiat-i-Ulema-e-Islam-Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F), a party that is one of the worst performing at elections and achieves a small percentage of the vote. Hence the question, rightly asked by many, is: how can such an unrepresentative political agent be given such an influence on legislative authority? Is it simply because this is ‘religious legislation’, and hence democratic principles are suspended when constructing religious authority in a legislative context? Why is there this ‘religious exceptionalism’?

There are also now questions being asked about the utility of the CII and the Federal Shariat Court in various parts of the political spectrum. Should bodies and organisations that have influence on the legislation of a nation state not be held to account and scrutiny, even if they be religious? After all, religion is divine and infallible but the musings and reasoning of no particular cleric, progressive or regressive, is infallible, and human knowledge, whether religious or secular, should not be treated as ‘divine’. Although the ‘conformity of Pakistani laws to Islam’ is determined by the Federal Shariat Court, the CII does maintain some sort of status as an eminent religious authority, and it still remains a constitutional body responsible for giving legal advice.

The history of religious authority in the Islamic tradition is too expansive a topic to tackle here, but the more pressing concern today is how to reconcile the authoritarian and coercive structures of religious authority present in Pakistan with the country’s stated allegiance to democratic principles. With the rise of the new and unprecedented political construct of the Islamic state (or Islamic republic) in the post-colonial era, questions about the role of shariah in this new political reality and how and who is to determine it have become more important. Who speaks for Islam? Who has the right to interpret the foundational and normative religious texts? Can there be a ‘state Islam’, a state-sponsored religiosity, which all have to abide by? Furthermore, even more tricky questions arise as to the nature of ‘true’ ijtihad: who performs ijtihad, who defines it, what is its scope?

All these questions arise when we try and merge republicanism with a legal discourse that spans over many centuries and many schools of thought with an irreducible complexity and diversity. In effect, a clash of mindsets arises — a democratic psychology when it comes to determining temporal authority, but a more subdued, devotion-based psychology when it comes to religious authority. It marks a dissonance and the conflict and challenges modernity brings to the dynamics of the Islamic tradition.

The innate pluralism, flexibility and diversity of shariah, it seems, is only quashed and repressed in the new political reality of the nation state. In an effort to codify and centralise the dispensation of shariah, the pluralism, complexities and subtleties of the legal tradition are being cast aside. One wonders whether merging the political structures of modernity in the manifestation of the nation state with the dynamics of such a vast and tradition-based legal discourse as shariah is a wise decision. Who does the state turn to in the absence of a divinely ordained clergy to determine these religiously-based legislative norms?

It seems in Pakistan the religious hierarchy is dominated by conservatives and more alarmingly radicals, hence the crucial question is, do these clerics represent the wider religiosity of the Pakistani public?

Indeed this is not helped by the unprecedented process of pluralisation and fragmentation of religious authority, comparable to that initiated by the Protestant Reformation. Iqbal too was keenly aware of adapting notions of religious authority in a legislative context with the new political paradigm in his Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam: “The growth of republican spirit and the gradual formation of legislative assemblies in Muslim lands constitute a great step in advance. The transfer of the power of ijtihad from individual representatives of schools to a Muslim legislative assembly which, in view of the growth of opposing sects, is the only possible form ijma can take in modern times, will secure contributions to legal discussion from laymen who happen to possess a keen insight into affairs.”

Again, the rupture of the juridical epistemology of Islam in seeing the determination of shariah as a matter for a class of individual scholars, juxtaposed to the need of centralisation in the context of a modern nation state is observed in this case. This conflict and rupture will continue to take place until serious questions about the nature, legitimacy and scope of religious authority is once again robustly discussed. Perhaps the conclusion from that discussion may be to realise the separation of the temporal and religious spheres of authority is needed or to opt for a more daring alternative and subject religious authority in an unprecedented move to some sort of democratic or even systematic contestation in the republican spirit Iqbal was advocating, rather than arbitrary selection. Ultimately, the fundamental question is: who speaks for Islam in Pakistan?

The writer is a student at the Royal Grammar School, Newcastle Upon Tyne, England