by Ali K.Chishti – Karachi

The present war in Afghanistan has many dimensions, many shades and many players, known as well as hidden. Most of the analysis fails to assess this subtle war and thus arrive at conclusions which are superficial.

Salient aspects of this war are as follows:

– A Proxy War

– A combination of State and non State Actors

– Known and hidden actors

– A case of hunting with the hounds and running with the foxes

– Ethnic Factors

– The Great Myth of 80,000 Troops

– A case of large spaces and insufficient force ratios

– A case of inconclusive civil war

– A case of Long Term US Strategic

Interests and its clash with regional actors

– A case of inconclusive civil war

– A case of Long Term US Strategic

Interests and its clash with regional actors

– A case of an undeclared Indo Pak War

Being fought in Afghanistan

– US-Pakistan relationship complex

– Pakistan at cross roads of choice of direction

We will discuss the above listed aspects in the succeeding paragraphs.

A Proxy War

The Afghan War was not war of Afghans against Afghans but a combination of Super Powers and Regional Powers backing local Afghan factions to achieve their selfish political ends. The first phase saw USSR backing its PDPA subsidiaries and USA backing the so called Mujahideen with Pakistan and Iran as regional players backing various factions of so called Mujahideen. This face lasted from 1978 to 1992.

The second phase saw a relative withdrawal of USA and another series of Proxy Wars with Russia , Iran and India generally backing some groups and Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and possibly China backing some other groups. This phase lasted from 1992 till 2001.

The third phase which continues saw entry of USA and its NATO allies and camp followers physically occupying Afghanistan and opposed by the Taliban, Al Qaeda and Hizb e Islami with non State actors backing them, while Pakistan pursuing a double game strategy of being US ally as well as having a ulterior strategy of secret relationship with the anti US forces.

In this face the USA and its coalition allies have as their proxies the de facto and de jure Afghan Government while the Taliban, Al Qaeda and Hizb e Islami are Pakistani proxies. USA has a long term strategic agenda in the region which could include, final reduction of Iran, denuclearising Pakistan and domination of Central Asia and a possible long term confrontation with China.

To take Taliban or Al Qaeda as isolated actors is a fallacy. Similarly the USA and its allies have long term strategic goals in Afghanistan.

A combination of State and non State Actors

9/11 was a decisive moment in history of warfare. It saw the triumph of non state actors over state actors. The US mainland which was never attacked in two world wars and throughout the Cold War was successfully attacked. Al-Queda showed there clout only after the previous US administration (Clinton) failed to take any serious action Bin Laden apart from the cruise missile attacks which came very late despite specific intelligence pinpointing Bin Laden’s positioning.

The most significant feature of the Soviet Afghan War of 1978-1992 was a fusion of non State and State actors. State actors like USA and Pakistan used non State actors like the so called Mujahideen as proxies to inflict attrition on State actors i. e the USSR and the PDPA regime and their armed forces. As a result the non State actors acquired technology and skills that in the long run would threaten State actors. There was a transition to Fourth Generation Warfare in which the state was no longer the stronger player. Non State actors challenged the supremacy of the very idea of state by using ingenious expedients, which were cost effective in the sense that devices of sabotage worth a small amount could destroy property or installations a 100, 000 times their small value. Trade and business which was the real foundation of the supremacy of the West over the east or the North over the South came under threat. The Al Qaeda or the Islamists threatened the very basis of Western civilization since the invasion of Rome by barbarians or the destruction of Byzantine and Persian Empires by the Arab Muslims.

9/11 was the start of an undeclared Third World War which has no fixed battlefields and is non linear.. It has no centre of gravity.

The two most affected countries in this war are Pakistan and Afghanistan. Both are under threat of destabilization and possible Balkanization by non State actors. The non State actors in both the countries have a certain power base small or big in the populace of both the countries. While the de facto/de jure Afghan Government is supported by the USA and its allies, Pakistan has support of China and a large number of non State actors i. e the Taliban, Al Qaeda and local Pakistani religious parties. The US aim seems to be long term and not mere short term neutralization of Taleban – a shift from there original Al-Queda strategy. However in Afghanistan the USA lacks freedom of maneuver because it is bogged down in Iraq and seems no clear cut strategy to deal with Iran and Pakistan.

In this complicated strategic situation the non State actors are in a position to attack USA and its allies at a time and place of their own choosing and USA and its allies are strategically overstretched (refer to the Faisal Shezad fiasco).

Known and hidden actors

The ongoing Afghan war has known and hidden actors. The known actors are Pakistan, India, Iran, USA and its allies. The hidden actors could be Russia, China and Russian Central Asian satellites. For the opponents of USA Afghanistan and Iraq are two great strategic opportunities to bleed USA and its allies white. Russia has been reasserting its muscle in Central Asian Republics. USA was thus booted out of Uzbekistan couple of years back. China is strategically dominant in Pakistan with the Gwadar Port possibly becoming an important Chinese naval base in the near future. Both China and Russia would not like to see USA dominating their soft underbelly. Who is financing the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other anti US forces remains a big mystery. Since all this happens very secretly it is difficult to identify all the actors. If the Taliban’s are Pakistan’s proxy, whose proxy is Pakistan? Is Iran alone in the arena against USA or has it got secret backers? Who is backing the anti US forces in Iraq? Why is the north of Afghanistan unduly quiet? Is it total serenity or a calm before the storm? If ISI and CIA are the major intelligence actors in Afghanistan , what is the role of the Russian FSB, Iran’s Itlaat and India’s RAW ? Undoubtedly Afghanistan is the Casablanca of all Intelligence agencies of the world. What is the Chinese factor? Is the Russian FSB alone or is it using its Central Asian Satellite republics diplomats in the intelligence game in Afghanistan? How much of the Al Qaeda’s secret money transfers are coming from Dubai and how much from Hong Kong? In Intelligence wars it is the rule to take everyone as a bastard till he proves to be otherwise.

A case of hunting with the hounds and running with the foxes

In the aftermath of 9/11 while under US pressure the Pakistani military junta adopted the policy of “hunting with the hounds and running with the foxes”. The hounds being USA and its camp followers and the foxes being foxes. The Pakistani military junta assessed that it was politically expedient to be USA’s good dog catcher while covertly retaining the option of a secret alliance with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The Pakistani military junta clearly saw the writing on the wall that USA in the final reckoning is a Christian power having the ultimate aim of denuclearizing Pakistan and reducing the Islamic world to the status of a petty subsidiary menial vassal. Right or wrong, this was the Pakistani military junta’s assessment about USA. Only history will prove if this is right or wrong. The former US General Abizaid has confirmed US intentions when he said that the war with Islamists may start a Third World War. The Third World War had however already started since 9/11. May be much before that, around 1990 or 1992.

Meanwhile while at least outwardly acting as USA’s dog catcher, selling Al Qaeda operatives to USA, as Pakistan’s General Musharraf admitted in his autobiography, the Pakistani military junta started losing credibility in the eyes of the Pakistani populace. The Waziristan military action launched by the Pakistani military junta is end 2003, further reduced its credibility in the eyes of the Pakistani populace and specially the tribal Pashtuns who had defied central power since long, whether it was the Mughal Muslim king, the Sikh Maharaja or the British Viceroy. For the first time in Pakistan’s history a serving corps commander was attacked in Karachi in end of June 2004. These factors led to a subtle change of course in Pakistani military junta. The high point of this change of course was the Waziristan accord of September 2006. Later under US pressure however the Pakistani military junta was once again forced to change the policy and a fresh operation was commenced in Waziristan in mid 2007. The formation of six Taliban factions under the umbrella of TTP is the greatest threat to the Pakistani national security since 1971. The TTP has more similarly with Al-Queda than Afghan Talibans and operates on the pattern of Al-Queda of Iraq who killed civilians indiscriminately.

It appears that hunting with the hounds and running with the foxes has now been generally abandoned.

In 2001 Pakistan was under heavy US pressure but by 2006 the Pakistani military leadership saw light of the day, that blindly following the USA would seriously reduce their credibility in the eyes of the populace and major gains both financially and strategically had been made by appeasing the USA between 2001 and 2005. Now was the time for a change of posture. The policy after that had been I) to corporate with the US against TTP II) Not to touch Afghan Talibans

Ethnic Factors

Ethnic factors are very central in the Afghan War. During the Soviet Afghan war one very significant political change took place in Afghanistan. The Pakistani intelligence agencies were successful in producing a divide between the official Mohammadzai line of confrontation with Pakistan among the Pashtuns of Afghanistan. Pashtuns of Afghanistan thus started viewing Pakistan in a more positive light. Moreover the Pashtun leadership was transformed and changed hands from a previously more dynastic one to a more ideological one with previously unknown characters in the lead rather than the traditional Durrani Pashtuns in the lead. Linguistically also the more dominant Pashtun leaders were now the chaste Pashto speaking Islamists rather than the traditional sophisticated and refined Persianised Durrani Pashtuns, who talked about Pashtunistan but could hardly speak Pashto.

When Pakistan at least outwardly sided with the USA in the aftermath of 9/11, it alienated a sizeable proportion of its Pashtun population. The Pashtuns are politically speaking the most significant ethnic group in Pakistan after the Punjabis. They have a sizeable representation in the armed forces and civil service ranging from 30 to 35 % . Politically they are the junior partners of Punjabis. In various insurgencies in Pakistan starting from the Baloch insurgency of 1948 till the Sindh Insurgency of 1983 and the Karachi Insurgency of 1986-96 the Pashtuns have been solid partners of the Punjabis. Pashtun separatist parties like the Awami National Party of Asfandyar Wali Khan and Afrasiab Khattak do good business outside Afghanistan but have very limited political clout in Pakistani Pashtuns. Long time Pashtun activist Juma Khan Sufi who stayed for many years in Kabul and married PDPA minister Sulaiman Laiq’s daughter has been highly critical of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan in his book on Bacha Khan published in 2005.

When Pakistani military junta sided with USA in 2001 and launched the Waziristan operation in 2003-6 , it lost all the credibility in Pashtuns that it had earned in 54 years since Pakistan was created in 1947. The Punjabi dominated army was visibly upset. Without Pashtuns Pakistan’s integrity was in danger. When the Taliban state was overrun although not conquered by the USA in 2001, the Pashtun perception in Pakistan was that a Pashtun state had been overrun. The Pakistani military junta consciously sought to change the perception and the various Waziristan accords were a step in this direction.

With Balochistan already in revolt and the Sindhis feeling deprived the Punjabis could not afford to lose the Pashtuns. In Afghanistan also the politics has now changed at least in the south from being tribal centred to ideology centred. This change took place in the period 1980-1990 and various attempts by the PDPA regime to mobilise the Achakzais and Afridis made many of these tribal leaders richer , but failed to significantly alter the military situation in strategic or even tactical terms.

The Great Myth of 80, 000 Troops

Afghanistan is full of overpaid Western journalists who have a few pet themes but hardly anyone of these have researched into the Pakistani claim of 80, 000 troops being deployed on the Afghan Pakistan Border to cordon and interdict the Taliban and Al Qaeda – the figure Pak Army claims to be now reached around 140,000. As per the research of this scribe, Pakistani regular troops in the apparent Anti Islamist role in NWFP and Balochistan provinces bordering Afghanistan do not exceed 25, 000 actual fighting men. Waziristan having two brigades not exceeding 10, 000 fighting strength and Balochistan having a weak infantry brigade in Chaman and Zhob. The other troops are the 100 % Pashtun FC (Frontier Corps) not exceeding 20, 000 actual fighting men along the most affected areas. The FC is highly unreliable in interdicting the Taliban since it is 100 % Pashtun . The vast length of the Pakistani border between Spina Theeza in Chaman sub district and Taftan on the Iranian border , a vast tract about 620 kilometers long has no Pakistan Army regular troops. Major Taliban interdiction takes place from this tract into Kandahar, Helmand and Nimroz. Zhob the rear base of the Taliban for Zabul, Paktika and parts of Kandahar has a undersized infantry brigade at Zhob city and no regular troops guarding the 580 kilometer border opposite Zabul, Paktika and Kandahar.

The Pakistani military perception is that any military deployment in this area in large numbers will weaken its main Eastern border with India and alienate the Pashtun population in Baluchistan and NWFP. The FC is a highly corrupt force, in full league with all the crooks and smugglers on the 2, 400 Km long Afghan Pakistan border and has been seen as the protectors of narco-trade routes which itself fuels insurgency.

A case of large spaces and insufficient force ratios

The US and NATO military strength in Afghanistan is a case of large spaces and insufficient force ratios. The 30, 000 US and NATO forces in Afghanistan can hardly produce 10, 000 troops for actual fighting and all these are highly dispersed. Further these troops are highly expensive in terms of salaries and logistics. A large part of NATO forces simply lack the fire to see the baptism of fire in the volatile Afghan south. Further Islamists or the so called Taliban have a good propaganda theme that the ongoing Low Intensity War in Afghanistan is a Jihad against Christian occupiers. It is fine to theorise in a well furnished office in Kabul that USA and NATO are not occupiers but came for ” Komak and Hamkari” but human perception is more absurd. Thus propaganda is successful. The coalition has no strategic plan but is conducting the war in a highly tactical manner with force commanders acting like section or platoon commanders. Perhaps the irony is that they hardly have anything larger than a platoon or company to put in action. With half the money spent on NATO forces, much better Afghan forces could have been raised. NATO forces in Afghanistan are not fighting against Taliban but against space logistics and mechanics.

A case of inconclusive civil war

The Afghan Civil War which started in 1978 has still not reached a conclusive end. Hence various Afghan groups have various foreign patrons which are using them as proxies to achieve their own particular national objectives. Disarmament has miserably failed although it has been good for many UN officials getting fat salaries. Disbandment will also fail because the UN or the concerned parties do not have sufficient muscle to enforce it. The result would be instability or potential instability as long as the illegal armed groups retain their political, military and financial clout.

A case of Long Term US Strategic Interests and its clash with regional actors

Being the centre of the global strategic game Afghanistan in strategic terms is just a stage and not an ultimate end of US strategic thrusts launched in the aftermath of 9/11. The US strategy seems to be to acquire air bases in Afghanistan which can enable to have strategic freedom of maneuver in any future contingency, rather than relying on Pakistan for air bases. Thus the emergence of Bagram and Kandahar as two Subic Bay replicas. This US strategic interest is in clash with the regional powers in neighborhood of Afghanistan i. e China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan and even India in the long run. Pakistan is only tip of the iceberg of opponents of US presence in Afghanistan. This scribe in an article published in NATION in Pakistan had identified Afghanistan as USA’s strategic opportunity. If USA had a debt of honor to vindicate or avenge Vietnam in Afghanistan , Russia has one to settle in Afghanistan. The Russians have become more subtle but no less ruthless. Half the journalists murdered in Russia since 1991 were murdered in President Putin’s tenure from 2000 till 2006. Being the historic highway of conquest Afghanistan provides USA with a Strategic heartland for future operations in geopolitical terms of Mackinder and Mahan. The next decade appears to be a decade of maneuver and getting into position by China, USA, Russia and even India. Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian Republics being junior players and tactical garbage collectors of USA, China and Russia. The USA will have multiple vulnerable areas to deal with starting from the very US so called homeland to a wide range of areas including Middle East, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan etc. There may be temporary stability in some regions but peace will be an illusion. The USA till to date is clueless about how to deal with Iran. By its Iraq faux pas it has already created a vast Shia bloc stretching from Iraq to Lebanon and has made Iran strategically stronger. Pakistan may be less easier to tackle as the Pakistani military junta fearful of losing more credibility in the eyes of US populace by being perceived as a doig catcher for USA and in the light of continues drone attacks which actually works.

A case of an undeclared Indo Pak War being fought in Afghanistan

Tragically Afghanistan has remained a scene of Indo Pak conflict right from 1947. Both the countries have their proxy groups in Afghanistan. Unless the USA and allies can restrain these two countries in a significant manner Afghanistan would remain unstable for many decades.

US-Pakistan relationship is complex

US Pakistan relation is complex. This fact was discussed in secret meeting of Pakistani formation commanders from 2001 till 2006 every year. On one side US is a Pakistan ally. On the other side it is an enemy. A Christian power all set to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear programme. What is DYNCORP dong in Afghanistan, it has how many Israeli agents dealing with Pakistan. These were hot on the Pakistani formation commanders conference list ?

Pakistan at cross roads of choice of direction

Pakistan is at cross roads of direction with a highly corrupt military junta and a bunch of crook politicians in alliance with this junta. For many decades it would remain a strategic threat for USA and the USA would have to bear with it because it has no strategy or if it has one US strategic freedom of manoeuvre would become more and more constricted with China, Russia and India gaining greater strength in the years to come. India will rival China as a power in the next two decades.

CONCLUSION
Afghanistan has been the subject of misconceptions par excellence as far as Pakistani analysts and Pakistani policy makers are concerned. First it is a misconception to state that Pakistan has all the cards to dictate the future policy in Afghanistan. While it is true that a large number of Taliban in South Afghanistan depend on Pakistani states largess by relying on Quetta and South Balochistan as a logistic base. True that Pakistan is the main trading partner of land-locked Afghanistan. However there are counter arguments to these facts. Afghanistan’s north, and this means some 50 percent of the country, has a population which feels that Taliban are Pakistani proxies. This north does not depend on Pakistan for trade. If Pakistani cement is the main commodity in Jalalabad, Russian Iranian and Uzbek Cement is the main construction commodity in Mazar, Kunduz and Herat.

The involvement of Pakistan inside Afghanistan has been rather heavy since 1978. Pakistan became the base of Afghan insurgents from mid 1978 some one and half years before the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Since then Pakistan and particularly its military have used Afghanistan and the Afghan war to get economic and military aid from the US, Saudi Arabia and many other NATO states.

Pakistani analysts are attaching too much hope to US cold shouldering India. The US itself has limited leverage and influence in Afghanistan. The country’s south is overflowing with Pakistan biased Taliban, also known as ‘good’ Taliban in Pakistan; Taliban who have never been attacked by the Pakistani military. The country’s west contains Iran related groups ever keen to IEDise US military vehicles. The country’s north contains Russian linked groups.

Afghanistan’s bureaucracy, civil and military, was trained in USSR and is formally anti US and anti Pakistani military. These are the decision makers at the final level as policy decisions finally go in their hands.

Pakistani analysts have floated another impossible theory that Pakistan’s ISI has won over the Northern Alliance. Nothing can be farther from the truth. The Northern Alliance understands the Pakistani security establishment better than any one. They know how Pakistani security institutions went to the last extent in destroying the Northern Alliance militarily and even politically from 1994 to 2001. How Ahmad Shah Massoud was fighting cornered in Khoja Bahauddin and only with Russian,Tajik and Iranian help.

The Northern Alliance understands that Pakistani policy in Afghanistan has to be Pashtun centric and Fundamentalist centric as these are the policy dynamics that Pakistan cannot alter because of political as well as geopolitical reasons. Only Islam would sell in South Afghanistan, Pashtuns are the ethnic group which the Pakistani establishment cannot afford to ignore, at the peril of Pakistan’s Balkanisation.

There is another geographical misconception in Pakistani analysts that the Chah Bahar Nimroz route is “much closer to the major Afghan cities than Karachi” as fallaciously stated by many Pakistani analysts.

Even a child can plot on a basic atlas and find out that the Nimroz route is longer than the Karachi Kandahar route for any major Afghan city including Heart, Kandahar, Kabul,Mazar except Zaranj which is a village like Afghan town on the border. Further this route is heavily dominated by Pakistan biased Taliban and heavy armed escorts are required even during day time. Geography dictates which even the mighty Americans cannot change is that unless plate movements severely alter the earths map, the route Karachi Kandahar will remain Afghanistan’s shortest route to the sea.

Pakistani analysts are phenomenally ignorant about Afghanistan’s transit trade. The main issue in Afghanistan’s transit trade with Pakistan is not distance from ports, which makes Pakistan Afghanistan’s best preference for eternity but Pakistani bureaucracy, which delays (by design) Afghan goods at Karachi and all the way to the border.

Thus for 20 years Afghans have preferred the 1200 Km plus longer Bandar Abbas Islam Qila Herat route for their transit trade.

Afghanistan will survive and prosper as an independent state provided its neighbors i.e Iran, Pakistan, Central Asian Republics and above all Russia leave it alone. Geopolitical realities dictate that this will not be the case. Afghanistan has remained the battle ground between the US and Russia, between US and Iran, between Pakistan and India and so on.

The differences between the Taliban and Northern Alliance are not only ideological but ethnic and sectarian when we include the Shias and Ismailis of Northern Alliance (a minority though).

The Russians, Indians and Iranians will not accept any US imposed solution on Afghanistan, civil war will recommence and Taliban will not get a clean run till Oxus River.
US largess, inviting Pakistan to strategic dialogue, ignoring Indians or the bulky Saudis would not solve this issue.

Two options are possible. One that the neighbors stop interfering. Utopian, which is unlikely. Second that Afghanistan is divided into a North with Northern Alliance and Pashtuns allied to Northern Alliance, a Taliban South, and a Baloch Autonomous region in the West, all along the Iran Afghanistan border to act as a cordon sanitaire for stopping Iranian interference in Afghanistan, and basic rights to Afghanistan’s Baloch regarded as Dravidians by Pashtuns,Iranians and Uzbeks.

At a same time, centre of gravity of the trouble in Afghanistan is not in Helmand but in the neighbouring countries. The infamous proxy war started in 1978 continues and various regional powers continue to patronise their proxies. The USA has two broad options i. e retain the airbases and intensify the proxy war so that all proxies are bled white, because DDR or DIAG or any kind of ABCDXYZ cannot reduce the proxies to size. The second option is to deal more effectively with the regional actors which may be far more costly. Happy the country that had no history. Afghanistan remains haunted and plagued by its violent history and its neighbours continue to enjoy the fruits of war and crisis in Afghanistan.

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