K Subrahmanyam: Talking to Kayani

India must find a way to engage Pakistan’s all-powerful Army chief

K Subrahmanyam /  July 29, 2010, 0:01 IST

India must find a way to engage Pakistan’s all-powerful Army chief

To no one’s surprise, General Ashfaq Kayani, the chief of the Pakistan Army, got his tenure extended by another term of three years by the civilian government. The decision was formally announced by Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gillani in a late night broadcast after he had consulted President Asif Ali Zardari, who also happens to be the chairman of the ruling party. After the recent 18th Amendment, the power to nominate the service chiefs had been restored to the Prime Minister as it was at the time of Z A Bhutto and in the second term of office of Prime Minister Nawaz Shariff.

This extension of tenure for an army chief by a civilian government is happening for the first time since 1955 when the government headed by Iskander Mirza gave an extension to General Ayub Khan, the country’s first army chief. At that time, the Pakistan Army did not have very many senior officers and General Ayub Khan’s extension did not create any controversy.

On the present occasion, a leading Pakistan daily, the Dawn, has commented, “Like it or not, the extension does not reflect well on the army as an institution. It is almost an article of faith that the Pakistan Army is the only viable, strong and vibrant institution in the country. Whatever General Kayani’s intimate familiarity with the present state of affairs and whatever his unique understanding of the situation, a strong institution should be able to withstand the retirement of one man, however experienced.

A compelling example of institutional concerns coming before individuals was provided recently by the US, where the architect of the present American counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan was replaced. This in the middle of a war that is by all accounts going badly for the US. Here in Pakistan, the public is constantly told that the internal security situation has improved, that the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is on the back foot, that progress, while slow, is real and meaningful. If it seems difficult to reconcile the idea of a strong institution having depth in talent and leadership with the ‘indispensability’ of a single man, then that’s because it truly is.”

General Kayani is not just the chief of the army. He is also the first Director-General of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to become the army chief. In that sense, he may not be the originator but truly the sustainer of the Pakistan strategy of using the various terrorist organisations as “strategic assets”. He is in direct control and charge of the “crown jewels” of Pakistan — its nuclear weapons.

General Kayani is a far more sophisticated man than General Pervez Musharraf, who felt compelled to make himself the president of Pakistan to be able to get proper protocol when he came to meet the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee at Agra in 2002. In the process, he had to rig two presidential elections and earn unpopularity among the people of Pakistan. By assuming direct responsibility for governance, he became accountable for the enormous governance deficit in the country. He got himself associated in the popular mind with the United States and thereby generated the hostility of the public at large and some of the more virulent jehadi organisations. General Kayani has avoided most of those mistakes.

He delinked himself from General Musharraf and gave the green light to political parties to push him out. He earned the reputation of having conducted the second free-and-fair elections in the history of Pakistan. Political parties hailed him as being democratic. He is not blamed for governance deficits and not even for the terrorist outrages committed by jehadi organisations earlier patronised by the ISI. On the other hand, he is hailed for fighting the TTP earlier nurtured by the ISI and he is considered indispensable by the prime minister and president to continue the counterinsurgency operations against the jehadis.

In spite of continuing terrorist attacks on US targets, the Obama administration argues that there is no alternative to the Pakistan Army and its present leadership to pursue the anti-Taliban operations in Afghanistan. Though General Kayani does not hold any Cabinet office, there is no doubt in the minds of Pakistanis and Americans who rules Pakistan. The strategic dialogue with the US is conducted by him with Foreign Minister Qureshi providing the façade of being the leader. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spends more time in discussions with him than any Cabinet member.

On the eve of the strategic dialogue with the US, he summoned all the secretaries to the government concerned with the discussion to the GHQ in Rawalpindi and chaired the meeting to finalise the agenda. When he expressed the displeasure of the Pakistan Army on the Kerry-Lugar legislation, a senator was rushed from the US to mollify him. Clearly, General Kayani knew he had made himself irreplaceable, which is why he was not replaced.

All this highlights that India cannot have effective communication with the real power centre of Pakistan by talking to the foreign minister, the prime minister or the now powerless president. For meaningful communication, India should be in a position to talk to the Pakistan Army chief. This cannot be done by our strictly apolitical army chief trying to talk to his counterpart. Here too, General Kayani has an advantage. He can let loose Mr Gillani on Manmohan Singh, Mr Qureshi on S M Krishna while keeping the ultimate veto power with himself.

Therefore, the Indian prime minister has to think through an innovative solution. That has to be an empowered personal envoy like the one he nominated to talk to the Chinese premier. He has to be knowledgeable to deal with terrorism, counter-terrorism, conventional military balance, nuclear deterrence, Afghanistan, China, evolving strategic balance in the area and bilateral Indo-Pakistan issues. Such missions have to be undertaken without publicity as was done with the “back channel” discussions during President Musharraf’s tenure.

In the US, Harry Hopkins was used by President Roosevelt in such a role. Will the Pakistan Army chief agree to receive a special envoy of the Indian prime minister? That will be a litmus test of his intentions towards India and his seriousness to have a real dialogue with New Delhi.

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