VIEW: The Cabinet Mission Plan —Ishtiaq Ahmed

For its part, the Muslim League passed a resolution on June 6, 1946 in which it regretted that the demand for Pakistan had not been conceded fully — but nevertheless accepted the Cabinet Mission’s proposals because the idea of Pakistan was inherent in them “by virtue of the compulsory grouping of the six Muslim Provinces in Sections B and C”

The recent discussions in the Daily
Times on the partition of India elicited a number of responses from readers eager to understand if by rejecting the Cabinet Mission Plan the Indian National Congress did not bear the main responsibility for the break-up of India. It should be recalled that the high-powered British parliamentary delegation consisting of three Cabinet Ministers, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and Mr A B Alexander, arrived in India on March 23, 1946. By that time the 1946 provincial elections had already been held and the Congress and Muslim League were completely polarised, while the Sikhs were leaning towards but not as yet aligned to the Congress in Punjab. Prolonged parleys with the three parties led nowhere. Consequently, the Cabinet Mission announced its own scheme on May 16, 1947. It rejected the demand for Pakistan because such a state would still have considerable non-Muslim minorities living in it: 37.93 percent in the northwestern and 48.31 percent in the northeastern areas (Transfer of Power 1977: 584). Additionally, 20 million Muslims would be left behind in a total population of 188 million for the rest of India. The Mission then considered a smaller Pakistan from which non-Muslim areas in the eastern Punjab and western Bengal would be excluded. It rejected that too.

The solution offered by the Cabinet Mission Plan had among other items the following chief ones:

1. There should be a union of India, embracing both British India and the princely states, which should deal with foreign affairs, defence and communications and have the power to raise finances required for those three areas of government activity.

2. All other areas of policy would be delegated to the provinces.

3. The princely states would retain all powers other than those ceded to the union.

4. Three sections or groups should be constituted by the provinces. Group A should include the Hindu-majority provinces of Madras, Bombay, United Provinces, Bihar, Central Provinces and Orissa. Section B should include Muslim-majority provinces of the northwest: Punjab, North-West Frontier Province and Sind (Sindh). Group C should include the Muslim majority provinces of the northeast: Bengal and Assam.

It was further stated: “The constitutions of the Union and of the Groups should contain a provision whereby any Province could, by a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call for reconsideration of the terms of the constitution after an initial period of 10 years and at 10 years intervals thereafter” (Ibid).

The Congress, in a resolution of May 24, 1946 declared that it was not agreeable to the proposals since it believed that an independent India “must necessarily have a strong central authority capable of representing the nation with power and dignity in the councils of the world” (Ibid: 679-80). The fact that the princely states had not been placed in the three groups, and, therefore constituted a separate entity that could decide what powers to cede to the Indian union particularly perturbed the Congress High Command. They were convinced that it was a British ploy to enter into direct relations with the princes and thus continue to be physically present with armed troops all over the subcontinent. Also, the fact that after 10 years the union could be dissolved rendered it too precarious and uncertain a basis to build a strong India. The Sikh leader Master Tara Singh sent a letter dated May 25, 1946 to Secretary of State for India, Pethick-Lawrence in which he said:

“The Sikhs have been entirely thrown at the mercy of the Muslims. Group B comprises Punjab, the NWFP, Sind and Balochistan…The Cabinet Mission recognises ‘the very genuine and acute anxiety of the Muslims lest they should find themselves subjected to a perpetual Hindu majority rule’. But is there no ‘genuine and acute anxiety’ among the Sikhs lest they should find themselves subjected to a perpetual Muslim majority rule? If the British government is not aware of the Sikh feelings, the Sikhs will have to resort to some measures in order to convince everybody of the Sikh anxiety, in case they are subjected to a perpetual Muslim domination” (Ibid: 696-7).

For its part, the Muslim League passed a resolution on June 6, 1946 in which it regretted that the demand for Pakistan had not been conceded fully — but nevertheless accepted the Cabinet Mission’s proposals because the idea of Pakistan was inherent in them “by virtue of the compulsory grouping of the six Muslim Provinces in Sections B and C” (Ibid: 837). It also agreed to take part in the constitution-making process. On June 16 the Cabinet Mission made a proposal for forming an interim government. It observed that major difficulties existed between the two major parties and therefore they were unable to agree on the formation of an interim government. For example, Jinnah demanded a 50-50 Muslim representation whereas the Muslim population at that time was only 24.9 percent of the total population of India.

On June 25, the Congress Party’s Working Committee formally rejected the proposal to form the interim government, but accepted the constitutional proposals and suggested it would put its own interpretation on the Cabinet Mission Plan. The same day the Muslim League accepted the proposals for an interim government but rejected the idea that the Congress could place its own interpretation on the British plan. On July 10, Nehru stated in a press conference in Bombay that Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly unfettered by agreements and free to meet all situations as they arise.

The Muslim League in a statement of July 29 declared itself greatly perturbed by Nehru’s remarks, on the grounds that it made the future status of the minorities in India uncertain. Some days later the Muslim League took the decision to withdraw its support for the Cabinet Mission Plan, and threatened to resort to direct action to achieve Pakistan. The next day it fixed the date for direct action as August 16. The direct action call resulted in communal rioting of exceptional barbarity, which spread like a contagion from Calcutta to Noakhali and Bihar. However, it was still 1946 and much more had to happen before partition would become a fact. A chance to keep India united did exist at that stage, albeit in a most uncertain and brittle manner. That risk the Congress was not willing to take.

The writer is a Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Stockholm University. He is also Honorary Senior Fellow of the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. He can be reached at billumian@gmail.com