2009 was one of the most tumultuous, and in many ways defining, years for Pakistan. The country was in a state of war. Incidents of violence reached new heights as several cities across the country became targets of militants’ response to operations in Swat and FATA or became victims of sectarian conflict. Peshawar was the nation’s frontline and suffered the most. While the army was regaining lost territory in Swat and South Waziristan, attacks against security personnel and innocent citizens continued. A wave of angst in the people turned the tide against Taliban and the ownership of the battle began to take root. A significant shift in public perception occurred when the real motives of militants were exposed, that is, capturing political power and using religion as a cover.

The resettling of internally displaced people in Swat has been relatively satisfactory, but those displaced from FATA are facing great hardships. Whereas military operation has been fairly successful, pockets of violence exist and the militant leadership is still at large, posing a potential threat of comeback.

Political leaders generally failed to capitalise on the success of military operations. Leaders rarely visited military units in the field or patients in hospitals.

The ultimate success against militancy would depend on economic development, and the strengthening of political and social institutions which is far too slow. The militants in tribal agencies, though linked by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), have different motives and dynamics. The army will have to devise a strategy that is different for each group..

The Jihadi and sectarian elements are also posing a serious threat to our integrity. No serious effort was made to harness and bring them back to the mainstream. The danger is if they are not dealt firmly, they could further strengthen nexus with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. There is also ambiguity regarding whether or not the army is fully on board in abandoning its past policy of relying on militant proxies as a strategic tool for India. The fundamental question whether Pakistan should be a Muslim or Islamic state needs to be reopened if fundamentalism is to be combated with full force?

Civil–military relations remained uneasy. Rumours kept afloat that the whole campaign against President Zardari was being orchestrated by the establishment and the media. On the other hand, the civilian government has yet to gain the confidence of the people or the state institutions that it can deliver. Its weakness in performance and policy issues contributed to providing political space to military leadership. Two events were significant. First, when the army intervened to prevent a collision between the government and opposition forces that were supporting the restoration of the judges. The second setback was the judgment on the NRO. This year also witnessed emergence of new power centers. The army is still a dominant player in foreign and security matters and considers itself the ultimate defender of the nation’s integrity. Parliament, in order to be assertive and play its due role, will have to engage in legislation, activate its committees to carry out oversight and make value added policy recommendations.

It is most disturbing that long-term problems that are the root cause of most ills are not even on the radar of the government. It was expected that civilian government would develop a long-term vision for the country in which neglected sectors of education, health and transportation will be given high priority and a plan of action with proper oversight implemented. Similarly, there was lack of progress on physical infrastructure. Acute energy shortages (at times crossing 3,500MW) persisted, causing major disruption in industrial activity and agricultural production with a negative fall-out on the economy. There is a false notion among certain politicians that electoral legitimacy gives them a carte blanche so scant attention should be paid to issues of governance and the state of the economy.

There were some important areas where the government made tangible progress. The consensus package for Balochistan raised hopes that after all, a political solution is possible if the genuine demands of resource and power-sharing are met. Still many obstacles remain, as military operations have traumatised the people there.

The other major breakthrough was the agreement on the National Finance Commission (NFC) for which credit goes to the prime minister and the provincial chief ministers.

Indo-Pakistan relations, however, did not improve. Old conflicts, especially Kashmir, kept popping up and Afghanistan became a major area of power rivalry. The agreement made at Sharm-el- Shiekh between the two prime ministers was not implemented as Dr Manmohan Singh faced domestic opposition. Meanwhile, Pakistan blamed India for meddling in Balpchistan and also in the tribal agencies.

The US made a long-term strategic commitment with Pakistan. Relations improved at government level and closer cooperation was achieved between military leaders, but anti-Americanism reached disturbing heights. Deep misgivings were expressed regarding the words and intrusive aspects of the Enhanced Partnership Act (Kerry-Lugar Bill). Similarly, repeated calls to do more and Washington forcing Pakistan to bend its will to its economic and military assistance were a bone of contention. The increase in security and staff personnel by the US embassy to manage the enhanced aid led to paranoia that CIA is planning to seize our nuclear assets. All these factors demonised America, despite its substantial assistance. These contradictions need to be resolved if full benefits are to flow from this relationship.

Our future remains uncertain and bleak because our leaders lack the vision and ability of putting our house in order. Moreover, unless we as a people genuinely believe that our country’s problems are primarily our own doing and face them squarely, we will not be able to extricate ourselves from this mess.

The writer is a retired lieutenant-general. Email: talat@comsats.net.pk