Iran’s nuclear swap option revived
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi

Yukiya Amano, the new director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has raised hopes that a “confidence-building” plan for a swap of nuclear material between Iran and a third party could still be salvaged.

At the same time, Amano used his opening speech to the Vienna meeting of the agency’s board of governors on Monday to reaffirm that Iran hadn’t provided “the necessary cooperation” to confirm all such material in Iran is for peaceful activities. He did not, however, repeat a February 18 report about “the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the development

of a nuclear payload for a missile”.

With regard to the fuel swap, Amano’s statement read:

In a letter to the agency dated 18 February, 2010,Iran said it continued to wish to buy the necessarynuclear fuel or, if this was not possible, to exchange some of its LEU [low-enriched uranium] for reactor fuel from abroad. Iran requested the IAEA to relay its request to potential suppliers and to facilitate the provision of the fuel. The agency circulated Iran’s letter to member states as requested. The arrangement proposed by the agency in October 2009 remains on the table. I believe it would ensure continued operation of the Tehran Research Reactor and serve as a confidence-building measure. At the same time, I am following up on Iran’s February 18 request, in accordance with the IAEA statute, and have been in contact with the relevant countries.

Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki threw some weight behind Iran’s letter. “The issue of a swap, it is possible to be carried out,” he said at a press conference in Geneva on Monday. “The agreement could be made now, but the realization, thefulfillment of the swap, needs time.”

Mottaki has repeatedly stated recently that Iran is willing to ship some 400 kilograms of its LEU in two stages, under IAEA custody, provided there is a guarantee of delivery of fuel rods for the Tehran reactor by the other side. Seeking to address Iran’s concerns, the United States, Russia and France pledged to the IAEA that they would fulfill their commitment to the terms of the IAEA-proposed fuel swap.

According to unconfirmed reports, William Burns, the US’s point man in the Iran nuclear negotiations, carried a message for Iran in his recent visit to Syria that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad delivered to President Mahmud Ahmadinejad. Reports of the message ignited the question of whether Damascus is now fully involved as a behind-the-scenes intermediary between the US andIran. Tacit confirmation of the role could be taken from a semi-official commentator’s view in Tehran that “an exchange of views through third parties is not mediation”.

Thus the “Syria factor” in the Iran nuclear talks carries double significance. On the one hand, it bolsters US diplomacy indirectly, and on the other it adds to Iran’s leverage by essentially nullifying any US-Israeli hope of weakening Iran by wresting Damascus away. The Ahmadinejad-Assad summit put to rest any such illusions in the foreseeable future.

When the US is lobbying the Arab world for a united front againstIran (not to mention similar effort regarding Iran’s Latin American allies), improved Iran-Syria relations should not necessarily be considered as a net loss for the US, particularly if Damascus has a moderating influence on Tehran.

Much depends on the nature of the Middle East peace process and the growing signs of trouble between Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah – as well as Hamas in Gaza, whose military commander was assassinated by Israeli agents in Dubai in January.

On the eve of the IAEA meeting, both Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the head of Iran’s parliament (Majlis), Ali Larijani, made forceful statements against nuclear weapons, aimed at further assuring the outside world that Iran’s nuclearprogram has a peaceful purpose.

Khamenei threw a jab at Amano by criticizing his report on Iran(which was leaked a few days ago) as one influenced by the enemies of Iran, while Larijani in his Japan visit last week invited his hosts to an international conference on disarmament.

In his speech on Monday, Amano, who has been in the job since December, defended his report. “It is longer than previous reports because I wanted my first report to be a stand-alone document,” he said. “I tried to make it factual, without overdoing the detail.”

However, the report’s uncritical adoption of certain information raises questions over Amano’s objectivity, given that in his first press conference after assuming the IAEA’s mantle he readily admitted that there was no evidence of weaponization on the part of Iran.

On Monday, Amano repeated that after extensive IAEA inspection of Iran’s facilities: “The agency continues, under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with Iran, to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, but we cannot confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities because Iran has not provided the agency with the necessary cooperation.”

Responding to Amano’s request, Mottaki in his press conference promised “full cooperation”.

The stage is now set for a meaningful multilateral dialogue onIran’s nuclear program that may result in a mutually acceptable deal that would represent a modified version of the initial “fuel swap” agreement unveiled last October.

Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran’s Foreign Policy (Westview Press) . For his Wikipedia entry, click here. His latest book, Reading In Iran Foreign Policy After September 11 (BookSurge Publishing , October 23, 2008) is now available.