WASHINGTON DIARY: The politics of power —Dr Manzur Ejaz

The end of the PPP government will come due to its outdated approach to contemporary Pakistan and not just because of Zardari’s corruption cases

Most of the so-called media-
forecasting gurus have been proved wrong with the passage of the18th Amendment in the National Assembly. Once again, it has been proven that inside knowledge of governing groups or institutions may be good for individual careers or personal grandeur but it is detrimental to being able to look beyond the obvious and immediate. In Pakistan, where all the major institutions are in a flux — each trying to enhance its share of power in the state — the task of forecasting is extremely hazardous.

Zardari-haters, for genuine reasons or personal vendetta, had been predicting that he would not spend New Year’s Eve in the Presidency. Making that a starting point for the PPP government to get squashed or emasculated, our fortune-tellers have been projecting different scenarios. This has not happened and the PPP government, along with President Zardari, is still in place.

Notwithstanding the PPP government’s problems in implementing the Supreme Court’s decision on the NRO and Zardari’s Swiss cases, the PPP government has gained some ground on a legislative level. The PPP’s slightly enhanced position may not be good enough to save it from ultimate demise because of pervasive economic issues like load shedding, inflation, the rising level of poverty, unemployment, deterioration of state-owned economic entities and corruption. However, the end of the PPP government will come due to its outdated approach to contemporary Pakistan and not just because of Zardari’s corruption cases.

Media pundits have been forecasting on the basis of their past experiences when, apparently, the overthrow or demise of the ruler at the top, resulted in a total overhaul or change of the system. From Ayub Khan to General Musharraf, most of the changes in governments can be forced into this simplistic model. However, the real reasons behind each change was different: Ayub Khan was ousted as the result of a popular uprising, Yahya Khan was booted out due to the debacle of East Pakistan, Bhutto as a consequence of a coup d’état supported by right-wing demonstrations, Zia was killed and Musharraf left because of a movement for the restoration of an independent judiciary.

Musharraf’s era ended in a unique manner. The process of change was triggered by the lawyers’ movement to restore an independent judiciary. This was the first time that a powerful professional group, without the leadership of the rich and powerful, had struggled for an institutional change and not for a change of faces (civilian or military) ruling the country. The PPP and the PML-N were quickly inserted in the field to keep the reins of the political game within traditional bounds.

Another aspect of the end of the Musharraf era has gone unnoticed. By 2007, the establishment had utterly failed in matters of day-to-day governance despite installing serving or retired military officials in every department and at every level. Furthermore, the explosion of Talibanisation and other jihadi groups in major areas of Pakistan was a reflection of the military’s failure in domestic security policy along with its Afghan policy. The country was in a similar disastrous situation back in 1971 after the debacle of East Pakistan. Obliviously, the military had failed on every front and, therefore, when Musharraf left, it could not boast of better governance than the ‘bloody civilians’ for some time to come.

The process of change triggered by the newly matured professional group, the lawyers, had implications much larger than the media gurus (always looking for reports for immediate consumption) were able to absorb and articulate. As a matter of fact, the end of the Musharraf regime had changed the traditional balance between different institutions. The media and the other intellectual classes, basing their understanding on a post-Zia civilian government and relations of different institutions of the country, had become redundant. In the new order, every institution, particularly the judiciary, the legislature and the military were all in an unprecedented struggle to claim a larger share of power. It was a new situation in which the military could not keep ruling the country from behind the scenes by using political forces or the judiciary.

In the new situation, all three major institutions — political formations, the judiciary and the military — are vying for a better share in state power without rocking the boat. They are all treading the water very carefully and therefore no dramatic change can be or should be expected. The judiciary has taken actions and introduced reforms in its own sphere, the military has largely reversed and corrected its security policy, and the legislative bodies have passed the 18th Amendment to rectify and streamline the democratic set-up in the country. Consequently, a new balance of power within the institutions will be established.

It is true that due to bad governance or misjudgements, the PPP government had to concede some key decision making powers relating to foreign policy or domestic security to the military. However, it does not mean that the political system has accepted these concessions as a fait accompli: new leaders can easily reverse the arrangement. In short, the power struggle between institutions is not over and the competition is still on.

In this context, President Zardari or the PPP government could be sent packing only by an outright military takeover, which seems unlikely at this point. Furthermore, a military coup or change of government by other means is only possible if there is a popular uprising. Obviously, none in the Pakistani political firmament is capable of leading a popular movement that can draw out most of the population. Therefore, the only institution that could delegitimise President Zardari — the PPP may still survive — is the Supreme Court. But the Supreme Court is not as reckless as some Zardari-haters would like it to be. It is taking time to follow legal procedures. Furthermore, the entire existing political class has problems similar to those of Zardari and is bound to be replaced. The Supreme Court may expedite the process of renovation in one way or the other.

The writer can be reached at manzurejaz@yahoo.com