ANALYSIS: Youth and militancy —Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi

Friday sermons in a large number of mosques preach how the West is out to undermine the Muslims and the Islamic world. It is easy to get radical ideological inspiration in Pakistan because Islamic orthodoxy and militancy have seeped deep into Pakistan’s state system and society

The failed bombing attempt in New York City has once again focused attention on Pakistan as an inspirational centre for Islamic radicalism and the vulnerability of young people of Pakistani origin to Islamic radicalism and militancy.

There is no evidence available so far to suggest that the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant groups based in the tribal areas or in mainland Pakistan have now embarked on spreading out into North America and the UK.

The young person accused of the unsuccessful NYC incident may have been inspired by the militant discourse on world affairs and he may have got some bomb-making training in Pakistan, but he does not appear to be an extension of the TTP or other militant groups. The details of the unsuccessful effort show that the young person’s knowledge of explosives was rudimentary and one does not have to go to Pakistan’s tribal areas to get such training. The young Pakistani-American may have interacted with some militant group for ideological reaffirmation. There are a host of militant groups: the TTP, other militant groups in the tribal areas, and the Punjab-based militant and sectarian groups.

These militant groups are not the only source of Islamic radicalism in Pakistan. Islamic political parties and a large section of the Islamic clergy based in mainland Pakistan preach radical Islamic perspectives of Pakistan and the rest of the world. Friday sermons in a large number of mosques, especially those whose prayer leaders are affiliated with Islamic parties or militant groups, preach how the West is out to undermine the Muslims and the Islamic world. It is easy to get radical ideological inspiration in Pakistan because Islamic orthodoxy and militancy have seeped deep into Pakistan’s state system and society.

However, acquiring a radical Islamic perspective does not necessarily mean that a person will certainly engage in acts of violence and terrorism. A small number of radicalised youth engage in violent activity either because of the long and persistent experience with militant groups or through self-introspection based on a radical and militant mindset. This is done either as a manifestation of alienation or as a religious obligation acquired through interaction with militant leaders.

Pakistan is experiencing the ‘youth bulge’. More than half of Pakistan’s population is under the age of 30, whose socialisation is heavily loaded with Islamic orthodoxy and militancy. Since the early 1980s the state pursued an agenda through education and the mass media to Islamise the state and society. Pakistan’s military and the intelligence agencies continued to patronise a religious hard line and militancy as an instrument of domestic and foreign policy towards Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir.

By September 2001, at least one and a half generations had been socialised into religious orthodoxy and militancy as a desirable mindset and a frame for action. These people have reached the middle level positions in government, the military, and other services. They may not directly get involved in bomb planting, but they have sympathy for Islamic radicals who engage in violence in the name of Islam. In this way the political discourse of Islamic radicalism and the political right has become integral to the mindset of countless people who tend to view national and international affairs in purely religious terms.

An Islamic and politically rightist mindset dominates the youth and post-youth generation in Pakistan. This mindset views Muslims and the Islamic world as victims of international conspiracies by the US and other western countries. They also think that Pakistan’s military action against the Taliban and other militants is not justified and it serves US interests. They strongly believe that there is a persistent international effort led by the US and India to undermine and destroy Pakistan and that Pakistan’s adversaries are not the Taliban. Islamists argue that the suicide attacks in Pakistan are undertaken either by the agents of foreign powers in the garb of the Taliban or, at times, the Taliban retaliate against Pakistan’s alignment with the US, or its military actions in the tribal areas.

This mindset has caused two most serious problems with the psyche of the youth. One, the concept of the nation-state and the notion of citizenship has been greatly undermined for them. Most are alienated from the state and do not feel obligated to respect its primacy and obligations as citizens. Their affiliation ladder starts from a person being a Muslim with religious obligations. It moves on to Islamic movements (non-state organisations) that uphold the primacy of Islam and moves on to an Islamic ‘ummah’ — universal Islamic community or brotherhood. It is a transnational religion-based identity. The state is relevant to the extent it helps to achieve the goals of a radicalised Muslim vis-à-vis others who do not share their Islamic-orthodox worldview.

Second, the notion of collective good or societal responsibility is replaced with the obligation of a Muslim towards God and the Muslim community represented by Islamic movements. The notion of a person or a group undertaking some steps for the welfare of the ordinary community or the nation-state is not important. Similarly, a radical Muslim may use violence without paying any attention to the cost of his action to other human beings, including other Muslims, or to Pakistan as a nation-state.

A large number of Pakistani youth are attracted to Islamic radicalism and do not feel obligated to the imperatives of collective good or societal responsibility except in an Islamic context because the majority of them have nothing else to look forward to in their life. The state of Pakistan pays little attention to their welfare and it is unable to ensure a secure future for them.

All those going abroad do not find it easy to obtain a secure and stable life. This also applies to a good number of male children of Pakistani parents in adopted countries. These youngsters have a tendency to develop alienation from the adopted country and become vulnerable to religious hardline appeals. They adopt an Islamic way of life and mindset that shapes their disposition towards the adopted country and the international system. These trends have become more pronounced after September 2001. A small minority among them may opt for violence against the state and society that is seen as nasty, unsympathetic and anti-Muslim. Their visits to Pakistan are for reaffirmation and reinforcement of the rediscovered Islamic identity.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst